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NOTES
Eminent Domain-Rights and Remedies of an
Uncompensated Landowner
It may well be doubted whether the nature of society and of
government does not prescribe some limits to the legislative
power; and, if any be prescribed, where are they to be found, if
the property of an individual, fairly and honestly acquired, may
be seized without compensation.,
Chief Justice Marshall uttered these words in the oft cited case of
Fletcher v. Peck,2 and the principle for which they stand is imbedded
in our constitutional system. The fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution reads in part: "[N]or shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation. ' ' 3 This principle has
not only been incorporated into the Bill of Rights, but exists in one
form or another in almost every state constitution. 4 Story in his
commentaries on the Constitution says of the phrase of the fifth
amendment:
It is founded in natural equity, and is laid down by jurists as a
principle of universal law. Indeed, in a free government almost
all other rights would become utterly worthless if the government
possessed an uncontrollable power over the private fortune of
every citizen. One of the fundamental objects of every good
government must be the due administration of justice; and how
vain it would be to speak of such an administration, when all
property is subject to the will or caprice of the legislature and
the rulers.5
The right to just compensation, in short, is one of the fundamental
principles of democracy.
It is commonly believed that the power of eminent domain, or the
power of governmental entities and quasi-public corporations to take
property for public use, is inherent in a sovereign state.6 But, as the
1. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810).
2. This case is normally cited as the first case in which the United States
Supreme Court held a state statute to be in conflict with the United States Con-
stitution.
3. U. S. CoNsT. amend. V.
4. Every state with the exceptions of New Hampshire and North Carolina
provides for compensation. See note 139 infra.
5. 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1790 (5th ed. 1891).
6. United States v. A Certain Tract or Parcel of Land, 44 F. Supp. 712 (S.D.
Ga. 1942); United States v. 8,557.16 Acres of Land, 11 F. Supp. 311 (N.D. W.Va.
1935) ; Town of Mount Olive v. Cowan, 235 N.C. 259, 69 S.E.2d 525 (1952).
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first paragraph shows, it is subject to the right to compensation,
which forms the subject matter of this note. The problem is what
remedy or remedies has the owner when a body having the power of
eminent domain takes property but fails to compensate the owner or
to institute proceedings to compensate him? In discussing this prob-
lem it will be assumed that there has been a taking for a public pur-
pose, which causes compensable damage to the landowner. It will
also be assumed either that the law requires compensation before the
taking, or, in states without this requirement, that a payment must
be made a reasonable time after taking and that this time has elapsed
before the action is brought. It is also assumed that the defendant
has the power of eminent domain. In states that have constitutional
provisions prohibiting the damaging as well as the taking of the
property, cases of damage will be considered as the principles that
apply to damaged property in these jurisdictions will likewise apply
to property taken.
Before discussing various remedies available to a property owner, a
close look at a recent case will indicate more clearly the problem fac-
ing the uncompensated landowner. In Barber v. School Dist. Number
51, 7 a school district in Missouri constructed a filter type septic tank
for disposal of water and sewage. Water from the tank flowed onto
the land of Barber, an adjacent farmer, severely restricting his access
to two or three acres of land. Barber sought to enjoin the school dis-
trict from disposing of water and sewage on his land. In denying the
injunction, the court recognized that damage had been done to Bar-
ber's land, but held that granting an injunction would cause greater
harm to the community since it might necessitate the closing of the
school. Although the reasoning of the court is understandable, Barber
has been damaged and has been denied the relief he sought without
being given any indication of how his loss might be remedied. The
appropriate remedies for a property owner in situations similar to
Barber's is the concern of this note.
I. INJUNCTION
If one's land is taken without compensation, perhaps the most
natural reaction of the owner is to seek to restrain the taker. The
landowner's most direct remedy is to enjoin the taking in equity. In-
junctions have often been granted when the defendant has eminent
domain power which would sustain the taking, but has failed to use
it.8 The most serious objection to the use of injunction in such cases
7. 335 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
8. Kincaid v. United States, 37 F.2d 602 (W.D. La. 1929); Dancy v. Alabama
Power Co., 198 Ala. 504, 73 So. 901 (1916) ; Tombigbee Valley R.R. v. Loper, 184
Ala. 343, 63 So. 1006 (1913); Birmingham Traction Co. v. Birmingham Ry. &
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is that abatement of public improvements can cause harm to the
public.9 Nonetheless a Virginia court has stated: "Injunction is the
proper remedy to prevent the taking or damaging of private property
Elec. Co., 119 Ala. 129, 24 So. 368 (1898); Organ v. Memphis & L.R. R.R., 51
Ark. 235, 11 S.W. 96 (1888) ; Beals v. City of Los Angeles, 23 Cal. 2d 381, 144
P.2d 839 (1943); Los Angeles Brick & Clay Prods. Co. v. City of Los An-
geles, 60 Cal. App. 2d 478, 141 P.2d 46 (1943); R. G. Foster & Co. v. Fountain,
216 Ga. 113, 114 S.E.2d 863 (1960); Harrison v. City of E. Point, 208 Ga. 692,
69 S.E.2d 85 (1952); Springer v. City of Chicago, 308 Ill. 356, 139 N.E. 414
(1923); Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Johnson, 204 Ill. 488, 68 N.E. 549 (1903);
Lowery v. City of Pekin, 186 Ill. 387, 57 N.E. 1062 (1900); O'Connell v. Chicago
Terminal Transfer R.R., 184 Ill. 308, 56 N.E. 355 (1900); Town of Hardinsburg
v. Cravens, 148 Ind. 1, 47 N.E. 153 (1897); Department of Highways v. MeKinney,
291 Ky. 1, 162 S.W.2d 179 (1942); Anderson v. State Highway Comm'n, 252 Ky.
696, 68 S.W.2d 5 (1934); Bickham v. City of Shreveport, 156 La. 648, 101 So. 8
(1924); Brown v. Inhabitants of Peabody, 228 Mass. 52, 116 N.E. 958 (1917);
Dunnebacke v. Detroit G.H. & M. Ry., 248 Mich. 450, 227 N.W. 811 (1929); Car-
penter v. City of St. Joseph, 263 Mo. 705, 174 S.W. 53 (1915); Spurlock v. Dornan,
182 Mo. 242, 81 S.W. 412 (1904) ; Gunn v. City of Versailles, 330 S.W.2d 257 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1959) ; Rubinstein v. City of Salem, 210 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. Ct. App. 1948) ;
Ates v. Wills, 243 S.W. 187 (Mo. Ct. App. 1922); Kime v. Cass County, 71 Neb.
677, 99 N.W. 546 (1904); Gray v. Manhattan Ry., 128 N.Y. 499, 28 N.E. 498
(1891); Emigrant Mission Comm. v. Brooklyn Elevated R.R., 20 App. Div. 596,
47 N.Y. Supp. 344 (1897); McMillian v. Lauer, 24 N.Y. Supp. 951 (Sup. Ct.
1893); Poovey v. City of Hickory, 210 N.C. 630, 188 S.E. 78 (1936); Ohio Bell
Tel. Co. v. Watson Co., 112 Ohio St. 500, 147 N.E. 907 (1925) ; Canada v. City of
Shawnee, 179 Okla. 53, 64 P.2d 694 (1936); Bogue v. Clay County, 75 S.D. 140,
60 N.W.2d 218 (1953); Horstad v. City of Bryant, 50 S.D. 199, 208 N.W. 980
(1926); Peterson v. Bean, 22 Utah 43, 61 Pac. 213 (1900); Meagher v. Appala-
chian Elec. Power Co., 195 Va. 138, 77 S.E.2d 461 (1953) ; State ex rel. F ortney
Lumber & Hardware Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 73 W.Va. 1, 79 S.E. 834 (1913).
See also Colorado ex rel. Watrous v. District Court, 207 F.2d 50 (10th Cir. 1953) ;
Grafton v. Baltimore & 0. B.R., 21 Fed. 309 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1884); Newberry v.
Evans, 97 Cal. App. 120, 275 Pac. 465 (1929); Stuart v. Colorado E. R.R., 61
Colo. 58, 156 Pac. 152 (1916); State Rd. Dep't v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, 1 So. 2d
868 (1941); Baya v. Town of Lake City, 44 Fla. 491, 33 So. 400 (1902); Boise
Valley Constr. Co. v. Kroeger, 17 Idaho 384, 105 Pac. 1070 (1909) ; Illinois Cities
Water Co. v. City of Mount Vernon, 11 Ill. 2d 547, 144 N.E.2d 729 (1957) ; Mitchell
v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 265 Ill. 300, 106 N.E. 833 (1914) ; State v. Marion Cir-
cuit Court, 238 Ind. 637, 153 N.E.2d 327 (1958); Midland Ry. v. Smith, 113 Ind.
233, 15 N.E. 256 (1888); McGinnis v. Wabash R.R., 114 N.W. 1039 (Iowa 1908);
Clark v. Wabash R.R., 132 Iowa 11, 109 N.W. 309 (1906); Bushart v. County of
Fulton, 183 Ky. 471, 209 S.W. 499 (1919) ; Dunne v. State, 162 Md. 274, 159 Atl.
751 (Ct. App. 1932); Beetschen v. Shell Pipe Line Corp., 248 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1952) ; Bridge v. City of Lincoln, 138 Neb. 461, 293 N.W. 375 (1940) ; Menge
v. Morris & E. R.R., 73 N.J. Eq. 177, 67 Atl. 1028 (1907); Sammons v. City of
Gloversville, 34 Misc. 459, 70 N.Y. Supp. 284 (Sup. Ct. 1901); Knoxville Ry. &
Light Co. v. O'Fallen, 130 Tenn. 270, 170 S.W. 55 (1914) ; Hjorth v. Whittenburg,
121 Utah 324, 241 P.2d 907 (1952); Ferry-Leary Land Co. v. Holt & Jeffery, 53
Wash. 584, 102 Pac. 445 (1909).
9. See note 29 infra.
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for a public use without just compensation by one who is invested with
the power of eminent domain,"'1 and such injunctions have been
granted in many jurisdictions." This remedy has been held proper
against both governmental 12 and quasi-public corporations. 3
The theory for granting an injunction differs among the jurisdic-
tions. Some courts grant an injunction theoretically to restrain a
tortious taking,'4 while others seem to be enforcing constitutional
provisions by use of the injunction.1 The underlying ground on which
10. Meagher v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 195 Va. 138, 146, 77 S.E.2d 461,
466 (1953).
11. Note 8 supra.
12. Beals v. City of Los Angeles, 23 Cal. 2d 381, 144 P.2d 839 (1943); Los
Angeles Brick & Clay Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. App. 2d 478, 141
P.2d 46 (1943) ; Harrison v. City of E. Point, 208 Ga. 692, 69 S.E.2d 85 (1952) ;
Springer v. City of Chicago, 308 Ill. 356, 139 N.E. 414 (1923) ; Lowery v. City of
Pekin, 186 Ill. 387, 57 N.E. 1062 (1900); Town of Hardinsburg v. Cravens, 148
Ind. 1, 47 N.E. 153 (1897); Department of Highways v. McKinney, 291 Ky. 1,
162 S.W.2d 179 (1942); Anderson v. State Highway Comm'n, 252 Ky. 696, 68 S.
W.2d 5 (1934); Brown v. Inhabitants of Peabody, 228 Mass. 52, 116 N.E. 958
(1917) ; Carpenter v. City of St. Joseph, 263 Mo. 705, 174 S.W. 53 (1915) ; Spur-
lock v. Dornan, 182 Mo. 242, 81 S.W. 412, (1904); Gunn v. City of Versailles, 330
S.W.2d 257 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); Rubinstein v. City of Salem, 210 S.W.2d 382
(Mo. Ct. App. 1948) ; Ates v. Wills, 243 S.W. 187 (Mo. Ct. App. 1922) ; Poovey v.
City of Hickory, 210 N.C. 630, 188 S.E. 78 (1936) ; Bogue v. Clay County, 75 S.D.
140, 60 N.W.2d 218 (1953); Horstad v. City of Bryant, 50 S.D. 199, 208 N.W.
980 (1926); Yates v. West Grafton, 33 W.Va. 507, 11 S.E. 8 (1890).
13. Dancy v. Alabama Power Co., 198 Ala. 504, 73 So. 901 (1916) ; Tombigbee
Valley R.R. v. Loper, 184 Ala. 343, 63 So. 1006 (1913) ; Birmingham Traction Co.,
v. Birmingham Ry. & Elec. Co., 119 Ala. 129, 24 So. 368 (1898); Rock Island &
Pac. Ry. v. Johnson, 204 Ill. 488, 68 N.E. 549 (1903); O'Connell v. Chicago Term-
inal Transfer R.R., 184 Ill. 308, 56 N.E. 355 (1900) ; Dunnebacke v. Detroit G. H.
& M. Ry., 248 Mich. 450, 227 N.W. 811 (1929); Emigrant Mission Comm. v.
Brooklyn Elevated R.R., 20 App. Div. 596, 47 N.Y. Supp. 344 (1897); Meagher
v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 195 Va. 138, 77 S.E.2d 461 (1953); State ex rel.
Fortney Lumber & Hardware Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 73 W.Va. 1, 79 S.E. 834
(1913).
14. Springer v. City of Chicago, 308 Ill. 356, 139 N.E. 414 (1923); Town of
Hardinsburg v. Cravens, 148 Ind. 1, 47 N.E. 153 (1897); Brown v. Inhabitants of
Peabody, 228 Mass. 52, 116 N.E. 958 (1917) ; cf. Harrison v. City of E. Point, 208
Ga. 692, 69 S.E.2d 85 (1952). See also Newberry v. Evans, 97 Cal. App. 120, 275
Pac. 465 (1929) ; Boise Valley Constr. Co. v. Kroeger, 17 Idaho 384, 105 Pac. 1070
(1909); McGinnis v. Wabash R.R., 114 N.W. 1039 (Iowa 1908); Clark v. Wabash
M.R., 132 Iowa 11, 109 N.W. 309 (1906).
15. Birmingham Traction Co v. Birmingham Ry. & Elec. Co., 119 Ala. 129, 24
So. 368 (1898) ; Beals v. City of Los Angeles, 23 Cal. 2d 381, 144 P.2d 839 (1943) ;
Dunnebacke v. Detroit G.H. & M. Ry., 248 Mich. 450, 227 N.W. 811 (1929); Ates
v. Wills, 243 S.W. 187 (Mo. Ct. App. 1922); cf. Harrison v. City of E. Point,
supra note 14. See also Ferry-Leary Land Co. v. Holt & Jefferey, 53 Wash. 584,
102 Pac. 445 (1909). For a more comprehensive discussion on constitutional
provisions, see text accompanying notes 132-48 infra.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1962/iss2/5
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it is justified, however, seems to make no difference in the administra-
tion of the remedy.
Many jurisdictions have refused to grant an injunction to restrain
such a taking or to enforce a constitutional provisiono for one of two
major reasons. One is that there may be another adequate remedy.17
16. Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95 (1932); Connor v. South Carolina Pub.
Serv. Authority, 91 F. Supp. 262 (E.D.S.C. 1950); Cubbins v. Mississippi River
Comm'n, 204 Fed. 299 (E.D. Ark. 1913); McCullough v. City of Denver, 39 Fed.
307 (C.C.D. Colo. 1889) ; Riggs v. Hill, 201 Ark. 206, 144 S.W.2d 26 (1940) ; Hillside
Water Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 677, 76 P.2d 681 (1938) ; Conaway v.
Yolo Water & Power Co., 304 Cal. 125, 266 Pac. 944 (1928); Stanton v. Morgan,
127 Fla. 34, 172 So. 485 (1937) ; East Fla. Tel. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 85
Fla. 378, 96 So. 95 (1923); Florida So. Ry. v. Hill, 40 Fla. 1, 23 So. 566 (1898);
Posinski v. Chicago, M. St. P. & Pac. R.R., 376 Ill. 346, 33 N.E.2d 869 (1941);
Brookings v. Riverside Drainage Dist., 135 Kan. 234, 9 P.2d 656 (1932); Keck v.
Halley, 237 S.W.2d 527 (Ky. 1951); Kentucky Game & Fish Comm'n v. Burnette,
290 Ky. 786, 163 S.W.2d 50 (1942); Schneidau v. Highway Comm'n, 206 La.
754, 20 So. 2d 14 (1944); Dynes v. Town of Kilkenny, 153 Minn. 11, 189 N.W.
439 (1922); Barber v. School Dist. Number 51, 335 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. Ct. App.
1960); Lewis v. City of Potosi, 317 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958); Bohannon
v. Camden Bend Drainage Dist., 240 Mo. App. 492, 208 S.W.2d 794 (1948);
Johnson v. Independent School Dist. Number 1, 239 Mo. App. 749, 199 S.W.2d
421 (1947) ; Meyer v. City of Alma, 117 Neb. 511, 221 N.W. 438 (1928) ; Barney
v. Board of Rapid Transit R.R. Comm'rs, 38 Misc. 549, 77 N.Y. Supp. 1083 (Sup.
Ct. 1902); Caruthers v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 155 Pa. Super. 332, 38 A.2d
713 (1944) ; Hyde v. Minnesota, D. & P. Ry., 24 S.D. 386, 123 N.W. 849 (1909) ;
Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Paint Rock Flume & Transp. Co., 128 Tenn. 277,
160 S.W. 522 (1913); City of Dallas v. Megginson, 222 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1949); Webb v. Dameron, 219 S.W..2d 581 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Hogue
v. City of Bowie, 209 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Henderson v. City of
Longview, 111 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); City of Jasper v. Brown,
39 S.W.2d 112 (Te. Civ. App. 1931); City of Wylie v. Stone, 16 S.W.2d 862
(Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Fry v. Jackson, 264 S.W. 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924);
Kahn v. City of Houston, 48 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Com. App. 1932); Barboglio v.
Gibson, 61 Utah 314, 213 Pac. 385 (1923) ; Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Lowman,
126 Va. 424, 101 S.X. 326 (1919) ; Irwin v. J.K. Lumber Co., 102 Wash. 99, 172
Pac. 911 (1918). See also Kelliher v. Stone & Webster, Inc., 75 F.2d 331 (5th Cir.
1935) ; Archer v. Board of Levee Inspectors, 128 Fed. 125 (E.D. Ark. 1904) ; Los
Angeles Brick & Clay Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. App. 2d 478, 141
P.2d 46 (1943); Sternes v. Sutter Butte Canal Co., 61 Cal. App. 737, 216 Pac. 66
(1923).
17. Hurley v. Kincaid, supra note 16; Connor v. South Carolina Pub. Serv.
Authority, supra note 16; McCullough v. City of Denver, supra note 16; Hillside
Water Co. v. City of Los Angeles, supra note 16; Stanton v. Morgan, supra note
16; East Fla. Tel. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., supra note 16; Posinski v. Chicago,
M. St. P. & Pac. R.R., supra note 16; Brookings v. Riverside Drainage Dist., supra
note 16; Kentucky Game & Fish Comm'n v. Burnette, supra note 16; Dynes v.
Town of Kilkenny, supra note 16; Johnson v. Independent School Dist. Number
1, supra note 16; Meyer v. City of Alma, supra note 16; Caruthers v. Peoples
Natural Gas Co., supra note 16; Hyde v. Minnesota, D. & P. Ry., supra note 16;
City of Dallas v. Megginson, supra note 16; Hogue v. City of Bowie, supra note
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As Professor McClintock has said: "If plaintiff is permitted by the
common law rule in the jurisdiction to recover at law the permanent
damages he will sustain because of the public use, the injunction will
be refused because the remedy at law is adequate."1 s A great variety
of other types of relief have been found to be adequate remedies: im-
plied contract,19 ejectment,20 damages,2' common law relief,22 and an
action in the nature of inverse condemnation. 23 The denial of injunc-
tion has even been based upon the availability of the extraordinary
writ of mandamus, 24 and upon an equitable lien.25 In some cases, in-
junctive relief has been granted because the court was unable to find
an adequate remedy at law, 26 while other cases have held that injunc-
tion is a proper remedy even if there are other modes of relief.27
An Illinois court stated:
16; Henderson v. City of Longview, supra note 16; City of Jasper v. Brown, supra
note 16; City of Wylie v. Stone, supra note 16; Fry v. Jackson, supra note 16;
Kahn v. City of Houston, supra note 16; Barbogio v. Gibson, supra note 16; Vir-
ginia Hot Springs Co. v. Lowman, supra note 16; Irwin v. J.K. Lumber Co., supra
note 16.
18. MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY § 147, at 394 (2d ed. 1948).
19. Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95 (1932). See also Connor v. South Carolina
Pub. Serv. Authority, 91 F. Supp. 262 (E.D.S.C. 1950); Stanton v. Morgan, 127
Fla. 34, 172 So. 485 (1937).
20. Hyde v. Minnesota, D. & P. Ry., 24 S.D. 386, 123 N.W. 849 (1909).
21. McCullough v. City of Denver, 39 Fed. 307 (C.C.D. Colo. 1889); Sternes v.
Sutter Butte Canal Co., 61 Cal. App. 737, 216 Pac. 66 (1923) ; East Fla. Tel. Co.
v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 85 Fla. 378, 96 So. 95 (1923) ; Kentucky Game & Fish
Comm'n v. Burnette, 290 Ky. 786, 163 S.W.2d 50 (1942); Dynes v. Town of Kil-
kenny, 153 Minn. 11, 189 N.W. 439 (1922); Johnson v. Independent School Dist.
Number 1, 239 Mo. App. 749, 199 S.W.2d 421 (1947); Caruthers v. Peoples
Natural Gas Co., 155 Pa. Super. 332, 38 A.2d 713 (1944); Hyde v. Minnesota,
D. & P. Ry., supra note 20; City of Dallas v. Megginson, 222 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1949); Henderson v. City of Longview, 111 S.W. 2d 740 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937); City of Jasper v. Brown, 39 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Fry v.
Jackson, 264 S.W. 612 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924); Kahn v. City of Houston, 48 S.W.2d
595 (Tex. Com. App. 1932); Barboglio v. Gibson, 61 Utah 314, 213 Pac. 385
(1923) ; Irwin v. J. K. Lumber Co., 102 Wash. 99, 172 Pac. 911 (1918).
22. Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Lowman, 126 Va. 424, 101 S.E. 326 (1919).
23. Hillside Water Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 677, 76 P.2d 681
(1938).
24. Posinski v. Chicago M. St. P. & Pac. R.R., 376 Ill. 346, 33 N.E.2d 869
(1941).
25. Stanton v. Morgan, 127 Fla. 34, 172 So. 485 (1937).
26. Gunn v. City of Versailles, 330 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); Ates v.
Wills, 243 S.W. 187 (Mo. Ct. App. 1922).
27. Dancy v. Alabama Power Co., 198 Ala. 504, 73 So. 901 (1916); Birmingham
Traction Co. v. Birmingham By. & Elec. Co., 119 Ala. 129, 24 So. 368 (1898);
Springer v. City of Chicago, 308 Ill. 356, 139 N.E. 414 (1923); Dunnebacke v.
Detroit G. H. & M. Ry., 248 Mich. 450, 227 N.W. 811 (1929); Carpenter v. City
of St. Joseph, 263 Mo. 705, 174 S.W. 53 (1915). See also Grafton v. B. & 0. R.R.,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1962/iss2/5
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Injunction is a proper remedy of the owner when an unlawful
appropriation of his land is attempted for the use of a public
corporation which has not acquired the right of such appropria-
tion by condemnation or otherwise. In such cases courts of equity
act upon broader principles than in ordinary cases and have
granted equitable relief without regard to the existence of legal
remedies, irreparable injury or other equitable considerations. 28
The other major reason for denying an injunction is the probable
resulting injury to the entity taking the land. The courts weigh,
balance or compare the relative injuries to the parties, and often
deny an injunction because the "balance" favors the body taking the
land.29 The denial of an injunction is characterized by such phrases
as "doctrine of comparative injuries,"30 "balancing of interests or
equities, ' 31 and "necessary public improvement. ' 32 In the Barber
case 33 plaintiff was denied relief because of the probable injury to a
school if it had to discontinue use of a septic tank for disposal of
21 Fed. 309 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1884) ; Newberry v. Evans, 97 Cal. App. 120, 275 Pac.
465 (1929); Boise Valley Constr. Co. v. Kroeger, 17 Idaho 384, 105 Pac. 1070
(1909); McGinnis v. Wabash R.R., 114 N.W. 1039 (Iowa 1908); Clark v. Wabash
l.R., 132 Iowa 11, 109 N.W. 309 (1906); Gunn v. City of Versailles, supra note
26; Beetschen v. Shell Pipe Line Corp., 248 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952). See
Tombigbee Valley Ry. v. Loper, 184 Ala. 343, 63 So. 1006 (1913); R.G. Foster &
Co. v. Fountain, 216 Ga. 113, 114 S.E.2d 863 (1960) ; Department of Highways v.
M Kinney, 291 Ky. 1, 162 S.W.2d 179 (1942); Poovey v. City of Hickory, 210 N.C.
630, 188 S.E. 78 (1936); Bogue v. Clay County, 75 S.D. 140, 60 N.W.2d 218
(1953) ; Peterson v. Bean, 22 Utah 43, 61 Pac. 213 (1900).
28. Springer v. City of Chicago, supra note 27, at 364, 139 N.E. at 418.
29. Cubbins v. Mississippi River Comm'n, 204 Fed. 299 (E.D. Ark. 1913);
McCullough v. City of Denver, 39 Fed. 307 (C.C.D. Colo. 1889); Dynes v. Town
of Kilkenny, 153 Minn. 11, 189 N.W. 439 (1922); Barber v. School Dist. Number
51, 335 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960); Johnson v. Independent School Dist.
Number 1, 239 Mo. App. 749, 199 S.W.2d 421 (1947); Barney v. Board of Rapid
Transit R.R. Comm'rs, 38 Misc. 549, 77 N.Y. Supp. 1083 (Sup. Ct. 1902); Ten-
nessee Coal, Iron & R. R. v. Paint Rock Flume & Transp. Co., 128 Tenn. 277,
160 S.W. 522 (1913); City of Dallas v. Megginson, 222 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1949); Hogue v. City of Bowie, 209 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948);
Henderson v. City of Longview, 111 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); City of
Wylie v. Stone, 16 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Irwin v. J.K. Lumber Co.,
102 Wash. 99, 172 Pac. 911 (1918). See also Archer v. Board of Levee Inspectors,
128 Fed. 125 (E.D. Ark. 1904).
30. Cubbins v. Mississippi River Comm'n, supra note 29; Johnson v. Independ-
ent School Dist. Number 1, supra note 29. See also Rubinstein v. City of Salem,
210 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. Ct. App. 1948).
31. Hogue v. City of Bowie, 209 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); City of
Wylie v. Stone, 16 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). See also Rubinstein v. City
of Salem, supra note 30.
32. Archer v. Board of Levee Inspectors, 128 Fed. 125 (E.D. Ark. 1904);
Dynes v. Town of Kilkenny, 153 Minn. 11, 189 N.W. 439 (1922).
33. Barber v. School Dist. Number 51, 335 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
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water and sewage. In City of Dallas v. Megginson4 the court held
that the discharge of waters from a sewer into a creek was a public
improvement, and that the general welfare should not be subordinated
to the protection of private property. But balancing of the general
welfare against the injury to private property does not automatically
preclude a court from granting an injunction, for in a given case a
court could determine that the private injury was greater than the
resulting injury to the general welfare, or that the public improve-
ment was not essential or important to the well-being of the com-
munity. -5 Such determinations would not be inconsistent with cases
in the same jurisdiction which deny injunctive relief because of harm
to the community. Thus, the Missouri court in Rubinstein v. City of
Salem38 enjoined the city from destroying a sidewalk, and was in fact
following the same general rule in the Barber case, 7 even though it
reached the opposite result. The court, when granting the injunction
in the Rubinstein case, said:
Courts in applying the rules of equity are always anxious to
work out the equities and justice of the cause. The extraordinary
nature of the remedy by injunction calls for a particular and
careful application of this guiding principle. In suits for such
relief injunctions are rarely refused where their refusal would
operate contrary to the real justice of the case and produce in-
equitable results. The relative convenience and inconvenience
and the comparative injuries to the parties and to the public
should be considered in granting or refusing an injunction. Each
case rests upon its own facts upon which the chancellor must
apply the rule of relative or comparative injury.38
But in Cubbins v. Mississippi River Comm'n,3 9 when private land was
flooded as a result of the Commission's maintaining and repairing
levees, the court denied an injunction because of the public interest
involved, stating:
Injunctions are not matters of right, and while they are issued,
not in the arbitrary or whimsical will, but in the judicial discre-
tion of the court, guided by the established principles, rules, and
practice in equity, regard must be had for the comparative injury
which will be sustained if the injunction were granted or refused.
If it appears that the granting of the injunction, although plain-
tiff may be ordinarily entitled to it, would inflict such great
34. 222 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
35. Los Angeles Brick & Clay Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. App.
2d 478, 141 P.2d 46 (1943) ; Rubinstein v. City of Salem, 210 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1948).
36. 210 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. Ct. App. 1948).
37. Barber v. School Dist. Number 51, 335 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
38. Rubinstein v. City of Salem, 210 S.W.2d 382, 386 (Mo. Ct. App. 1948).
39. 204 Fed. 299 (E.D. Ark. 1913).
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damage on the defendants or the public that that suffered by the
plaintiff, if the injunction is refused, will be relatively insignif-
icant, an injunction must be refused.40
Some jurisdictions use a combination of the adequate legal remedy
and the public welfare in denying injunctive relief,41 while others
use only one.42
II. QUALIFIED INJUNCTION
A conditional or qualified injunction is sometimes granted.4 A
qualified injunction differs from a permanent injunction in that it
does not take effect unless or until the body taking the land fails to
compensate the landowner. Under the threat of injunction, the entity
taking the land is forced to compensate the landowner.44 Since the
40. Id. at 307.
41. McCullough v. City of Denver, 39 Fed. 307 (C.C.D. Colo. 1889); Hillside
Water Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 677, 76 P.2d 681 (1938); Dynes v.
Town of Kilkenny, 153 Minn. 11, 189 N.W. 439 (1922); Johnson v. Independent
School Dist. Number 1, 239 Mo. App. 749, 199 S.W.2d 421 (1947) ; City of Dallas v.
Megginson, 222 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Webb v. Dameron, 219 S.W.2d
581 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) ; Henderson v. City of Longview, 111 S.W.2d 740 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1937); City of Wylie v. Stone, 16 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929);
Irwin v. J.K. Lumber Co., 102 Wash. 99, 172 Pac. 911 (1918).
42. See notes 17 and 29 supra.
43. This type of injunction is variously called, "conditional," "qualified," "tem-
porary," and "alternative."
44. Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933); Kincaid v. United
States, 37 F.2d 602 (W.D. La. 1929) ; Tombigbee Valley R.R. v. Loper, 184 Ala.
343, 63 So. 1006 (1913) ; Birmingham Traction Co. v. Birmingham Ry. & Elec. Co.,
119 Ala. 129, 24 So. 368 (1898); Organ v. Memphis & L.R. R.R., 51 Ark. 235, 11
S.W. 96 (1889); Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935);
State Rd. Dep't v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, 1 So. 2d 868 (1941); Rock Island &
Peoria Ry. v. Johnson, 204 Ill. 488, 68 N.E. 549 (1903) ; Carpenter v. City of St.
Joseph, 263 Mo. 705, 174 S.W. 53 (1915) ; Bridge v. City of Lincoln, 138 Neb. 461,
293 N.W. 375 (1940); Kime v. Cass County, 71 Neb. 677, 99 N.W. 546 (1904);
Grey ex rel. Simmons v. Mayor, 60 N.J. Eq. 385, 45 At]. 995 (Ct. Err. & App.
1900); Menge v. Morris & E. R.R., 73 N.J. Eq. 177, 67 At]. 1028 (Ch. 1907);
Gray v. Manhattan Ry., 128 N.Y. 499, 28 N.E. 498 (1891); Canada v. City of
Shawnee, 179 Okla. 53, 64 P.2d 694 (1936); Yates v. Town of West Grafton, 33
W.Va. 507, 11 S.E. 8 (1890). See also Colorado ex rel. Watrous v. District Court,
207 F.2d 50 (10th Cir. 1953); Grafton v. B. & 0. R.R., 21 Fed. 309 (C.C.S.D.
Ohio 1884); City of Birmingham v. Alabama Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 231 Ala.
558, 165 So. 817 (1936); State Highway Comm'n v. Bush, 195 Ark. 920, 114
S.W.2d 1061 (1938); State Highway Comm'n v. Kincannon, 193 Ark. 450, 100
S.W.2d 969 (1937); Felton Water Co. v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. App. 382, 256
Pac. 255 (1927); Dunne v. State, 162 Md. 274, 159 Atl. 751 (Ct. App. 1932);
O'Reilly v. New York Elevated R.R., 148 N.Y. 347, 42 N.E. 1063 (1896) ; Flynn
v. New York W. & B. Ry., 139 App. Div. 199, 123 N.Y. Supp. 759 (1910) ; Knox-
ville Ry. & Light Co. v. O'Fallen, 130 Tenn. 270, 170 S.W. 55 (1914); Ferry-Leary
Land Co. v. Holt & Jeffery, 53 Wash. 584, 102 Pac. 445 (1909).
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body taking the land is allowed to keep the property it has taken,
public improvements need not be abated when the qualified injunction
is used. At the same time, private rights are not abused since the
landowner will be compensated as a result of agreement between the
parties or as a result of condemnation proceedings which the qualified
injunction forces the taking party to institute. The theory underlying
the qualified injunction is similar to the theory behind the absolute
injunction. Both types of injunction have been used by courts to
protect a constitutional 5 right and to enjoin a trespass. 46 Since a
qualified injunction has the effect of forcing eminent domain pro-
ceedings, it is similar in this respect to a writ of mandamus. 47
The qualified injunction has been applied in two distinct ways.
Under one method it does not take effect unless the taking party fails
to institute condemnation proceedings. 8 In jurisdictions where an
injunction will not be granted unless there is a failure to institute
proceedings, there may be a time limit within which the proceedings
must be brought.4 9 If the proceedings are not brought within the
specified time period, an injunction will be granted. The other view-
point is that the qualified injunction takes effect at once and binds
the defendant until compensation is paid.53 This distinction is not
without significance. In its first form the qualified injunction denies
the landowner relief for a considerable period of time. In its second
form, however, the injunction provides relief immediately.
45. Birmingham Traction Co. v. Birmingham Ry. & Elec. Co., supra note 44.
See Colorado ex rel. Watrous v. District Court, supra note 44; Ferry-Leary Land
Co. v. Holt & Jeffery, supra note 44.
46. Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933); Carpenter v. City
of St. Joseph, 263 Mo. 705, 174 S.W. 53 (1915); Menge v. Morris & E. R.R., 73
N.J. Eq. 177, 67 Atl. 1028 (Ch. 1907).
47. See text accompanying notes 60-73 supra.
48. Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933); Gunn v. City of
Versailles, 330 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); Kime v. Cass County, 71 Neb.
677, 99 N.W. 546 (1904); Menge v. Morris & E. R.R., 73 N.J. Eq. 177, 67 Atl.
1028 (Ch. 1907).
49. Menge v. Morris & E. R.R., supra note 48. Although many cases do not set
forth a time period in which the eminent domain proceedings must be brought, it
can probably be inferred that the outside limit is the prescriptive period by which
the taking body would acquire a prescriptive right. See Kime v. Cass County,
supra note 48.
50. Kincaid v. United States, 37 F.2d 602 (W.D. La. 1929); Birmingham
Traction Co. v. Birmingham Ry. & Elec. Co., 119 Ala. 129, 24 So. 368 (1898);
Organ v. Memphis & L.R. R.R., 51 Ark. 235, 11 S.W. 96 (1889); Rock Island &
Peoria Ry. v. Johnson, 204 Ill. 488, 68 N.E. 549 (1903); Carpenter v. City of St.
Joseph, 263 Mo. 705, 174 S.W. 53 (1915) ; Bridge v. City of Lincoln, 138 Neb. 461,
293 N.W. 375 (1940); Yates v. Town of W. Grafton, 33 W.Va. 507, 11 S.E. 8
(1890).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1962/iss2/5
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
III. OTHER EQUITABLE RELIEF
Courts of equity have, although infrequently, granted two other
types of relief to the landowner. In some cases the court has granted
an equitable lien on the appropriated property,"1 and the Supreme
Court of Alabama has indicated that an uncompensated landowner's
mode of relief is to receive damages in equity. 52
In the cases in which an equitable lien is granted, the courts term
it a vendor's lien. It has been held that the lien is granted as a result
of an implied contract.53 In Stanton v. Morgan," the court granted
an equitable lien on property which a county took to build a road.
"[T]he law will imply a promise and obligation on the part of the
defendants to pay the plaintiff a reasonable purchase price therefor,
and that plaintiff has a vendor's lien on said street and property, as
security for the same, and that said lien is foreclosable."' 5  If such
a case should be pressed to foreclosure, it seems that the interference
with the public use would be as drastic as would follow from any
injunction. On the other hand, the plaintiff in foreclosure could
hardly hope to sell a road, and would probably be reduced to taking it
back.
Damages are granted in equity occasionally in lieu of an injunc-
tion,5 6 more commonly in addition to one.57 Thus, when an injunction
is granted courts will often also award damages for past injuries.
Courts in Alabama differ from the normal rule, as they have asserted
that the court of equity should award damages even though no other
type of relief is sought. An Alabama courtF stated:
If the county through its duly constituted authorities without
the consent of the landowner whose title and possession is not
51. Organ v. Memphis & L.R. R.R., 51 Ark. 235, 11 S.W. 96 (1889); Rosen-
baum v. State Rd. Dep't, 129 Fla. 723, 177 So. 220 (1937); Stanton v. Morgan,
127 Fla. 34, 172 So. 485 (1937); Hillsborough County'v. Kensett, 107 Fla. 237,
144 So. 393 (1932); Florida So. Ry. v. Hill, 40 Fla. 1, 23 So. 566 (1898). See also
State ex rel. Roberts v. Eicher, 178 S.W. 171 (Mo. 1915).
52. Benson v. Pickens County, 253 Ala. 134, 43 So. 2d 113 (1949) ; Middleton v.
St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 228 Ala. 323, 153 So. 256 (1934).
53. Stanton v. Morgan, 127 Fla. 34, 172 So. 485 (1937) ; Hillsborough County
v. Kensett, 107 Fla. 237, 144 So. 393 (1932); Florida So. Ry. v. Hill, 40 Fla. 1,
23 So. 566 (1898).
54. 127 Fla. 34, 172 So. 485 (1937).
55. Id. at 38, 172 So. at 487.
56. MCCLINTOCK, EQuITY § 52, at 121 (2d ed. 1948).
57. See note 36 supra.
58. Benson v. Pickens County, 253 Ala. 134, 43 So. 2d 113 (1949).
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disputed takes or undertakes to appropriate private property for
public use, a court of equity will intervene and require just com-
pensation to be made.
59
The Alabama courts do not seem to realize how unusual their practice
is.
IV. MANDAMUS
The extraordinary writ of mandamus lies to compel public officers
and corporations to obey and execute the laws. In several jurisdic-
tions mandamus has been held to be the proper remedy to compel
state and local officials to institute condemnation proceedings.6 0 Nor-
mally, however, the writ is not granted unless there is no other ef-
fectual remedy available.-
Since mandamus does not lie to enforce discretionary duties, courts
59. Id. at 137-38, 43 So. 2d at 116.
60. People ex ret. Haynes v. Rosenstone, 16 Ill. 2d 513, 158 N.E.2d 577 (1959);
Grunewald v. City of Chicago, 371 Ill. 528, 21 N.E.2d 739 (1939); Anderlik v.
State Highway Comm'n, 240 Iowa 919, 38 N.W.2d 605 (1949); Baird v. Johnston,
230 Iowa 161, 297 N.W. 315 (1941) ; State v. Anderson, 220 Minn. 139, 19 N.W.2d
70 (1945) ; Brown v. Murphy, 134 N.J.L. 318, 47 A.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 1946) ; Rice v.
Murphy, 47 A.2d 597 (N.J. 1946); Empire Trust Co. v. Board of Commerce &
Nay., 124 N.J.L. 406, 11 A.2d 752 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Thomson v. State Highway
Comm'n, 10 N.J. Misc. 877, 161 Atl. 192 (Sup. Ct. 1932); Klaus v. Mayor of
Jersey City, 69 N.J.L. 127, 54 Atl. 220 (Sup. Ct. 1903); Brown v. Murphy, 136
N.J.L. 183, 54 A.2d 763 (Ct. Err. & App. 1947); Mount Vernon Realty Corp. v.
City of Mount Vernon, 241 App. Div. 882, 271 N.Y. Supp. 742 (1934) ; Star Sand
& Gravel Corp. v. Marsh, 133 Misc. 388, 232 N.Y. Supp. 235 (Sup. Ct. 1929) ; Mc-
Dowell v. City of Asheville, 112 N.C. 747, 17 S.E. 537 (1893); Bland v. City
Council, 203 S.C. 392, 27 S.E.2d 498 (1943); Gibson v. City Council, 64 S.C. 455,
42 S.E. 206 (1902); Hicks v. Anderson, 182 Va. 195, 28 S.E.2d 629 (1944);
Appalachian Elec. Power Co. v. Sawyers, 141 W.Va. 769, 93 S.E.2d 25 (1956);
Stephenson v. Cavendish, 132 W.Va. 361, 59 S.E.2d 459 (1950); Riggs V. State
Rd. Comm'r, 120 W.Va. 298, 197 S.E. 813 (1938); State ex rel. Smith v. Board
of Supervisors, 68 Wis. 502, 32 N.W. 228 (1887) ; State ex ret. Smith v. Board of
Supervisors, 66 Wis. 199, 28 N.W. 140 (1886). See also Pacific Nat'l Fire Ins. Co.
v. T.V.A., 89 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Va. 1950); Folmar v. Brantley, 238 Ala. 681,
193 So. 122 (1939) ; Stuart v. Colorado E. R.R., 61 Colo. 58, 156 Pac. 152 (1916) ;
Posinski v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P. R.R., 376 Ill. 346, 33 N.E.2d 869 (1941);
People ex rel. Kochersperger v. Sass, 171 Ill. 357, 49 N.E. 501 (1898); State v.
Owen, 23 N.J. Misc. 123, 41 A.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Haycock v. Jannarone, 99
N.J.L. 183, 122 Atl. 805 (Ct. Err. & App. 1923) ; Wilson v. City of Cincinnati, 172
Ohio St. 303, 175 N.E.2d 725 (1961); Parrish v. Town of Yorkville, 96 S.C. 24,
79 S.E. 635 (1913); Garraux v. City Council, 53 S.C. 575, 31 S.E. 597 (1898);
Haase v. City of Memphis, 149 Tenn. 235, 259 S.W. 545 (1924); State v. District
Court, 98 Utah 348, 78 P.2d 502 (1937); Hardy v. Simpson, 118 W.Va. 440, 190
S.E. 680 (1937) ; Olen v. Waupaca County, 238 Wis. 442, 300 N.W. 178 (1941);
cf. Wolfram v. State, 246 Minn. 264, 74 N.W.2d 510 (1956).
61. 6 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 28.21, at 372 (3d ed. 1953).
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granting mandamus in land-appropriation cases are necessarily hold-
ing that the duty is ministerial. 2 As one court has put it:
The city had the discretion to acquire an airport or not to ac-
quire it, to take this or that land or not to take it. It did not have
the discretion to take land without paying for it. After the talc-
ing the duty to condemn became ministerial.63
A public body is often vested with statutory power to institute a
condemnation proceeding. Even though the appropriating body has
the sole power to institute the proceeding, some jurisdictions have
issued mandamus to enforce the statute in favor of the landowner."4
The effect of the issuance of the writ is to give the landowner as well
as the taking body the right to enforce the statute.
Since, historically, mandamus does not lie unless all other remedies
fail,6 5 the writ has often been denied in land appropriation cases be-
cause other remedies were available." The Washington court in
State ex rel. Wkitten v. City of Spokane,67 stated: "Having a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy at law, this proceeding cannot be main-
tained, for it is a well established rule that mandamus will not lie
where there is an adequate remedy at law."6 " Other courts, however,
have granted mandamus even though another remedy is available."
62. State v. Anderson, 220 Minn. 139, 19 N.W.2d 70 (1945) ; Brown v. Murphy,
134 N.J.L. 318, 47 A.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Empire Trust Co. v. Board of Com-
merce & Nay., 124 N.J.L. 406, 11 A.2d 752 (Sup. Ct. 1940) ; Bland v. City Council,
203 S.C. 392, 27 S.E.2d 498 (1943); Parrish v. Town of Yorkville, 96 S.C. 24, 79
S.E. 635 (1913); Gibson v. City Council, 64 S.C. 455, 42 S.E. 206 (1902); Hicks
v. Anderson, 182 Va. 195, 28 S.E.2d 629 (1944).
63. Brown v. Murphy, supra note 62, at 321, 47 A.2d at 597.
64. State v. Owen, 23 N.J. Misc. 123, 41 A.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1945) ; Haycock v.
Jannarone, 99 N.J.L. 183, 122 Atl. 805 (Ct. Err. & App. 1923); Bland v. City
Council, 203 S.C. 392, 27 S.E.2d 498 (1943); Parrish v. Town of Yorkville, 96 S.C.
24, 79 S.E. 635 (1913) ; Garraux v. City Coitncil, 53 S.C. 575, 31 S.E. 597 (1898).
65. Rex v. Wheeler, Cun. 155, 94 Eng. Rep. 1123 (K.B. 1766); Rex v. Barker,
3 Burr. 1265, 97 Eng. Rep. 823 (K.B. 1762).
66. See note 201, supra. See also Colorado ex rel. Watrous v. District Court,
207 F.2d 50 (10th Cir. 1953); Bryant v. State Highway Comm'n, 342 S.W.2d 415
(Ark. 1961); Atchison v. State Highway Comm'n, 161 Kan. 661, 171 P.2d 287
(1946) ; Brewitz v. City of St. Paul, 256 Minn. 225, 99 N.W.2d. 456 (1956) ; People
ex Tel. Melenbacker v. Harrison, 123 App. Div. 914, 108 N.Y. Supp. 1144 (1908);
Farr v. Steele, 128 S.C. 293, 121 S.E. 792 (1924); Fritts v. Leech, 201 Tenn. 18,
296 S.W.2d 834 (1956); Phillips v. Marion County, 166 Tenn. 83, 69 S.W.2d 507
(1933); State ex rel. Whitten v. City of Spokane, 92 Wash. 667, 159 Pac. 805
(1916).
67. 92 Wash. 667, 159 Pac. 805 (1916).
68. Id. at 668, 159 Pac. at 805.
69. Folmar v. Brantley, 238 Ala. 681, 193 So. 122 (1939); Grunewald v. City
of Chicago, 371 Ill. 528, 21 N.E.2d 739 (1939); cf. Pacific Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v.
T.V.A., 89 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Va. 1950).
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In these jurisdictions the landowner has a right to elect the remedy
he thinks is best suited to his particular situation.
Mandamus was denied in Colorado ex rel. Watrous v. District
Court, 7 by the use of rather unusual reasoning. Colorado sought and
was granted a writ of prohibition to prohibit the District Court from
granting mandamus to force the State Highway Commission to bring
condemnation proceedings. The court held mandamus would not lie
against the state. Under Colorado law, the state can not take land
without compensation. Therefore, the court reasons, when land is
taken by a state agency without compensating the landowner, the
taking is unlawful and not the act of the state. The court's logic is
somewhat unique and reminds one of the old adage that the king can
do no wrong. The following quotation from the court's opinion pro-
vides a sample of the reasoning:
It follows that when a state agency enters upon land or injures
land within the meaning of Section 15, Article II of the Colorado
Constitution, without paying just compensation therefor, or
without having commenced condemnation proceedings to ascer-
tain the compensation due for the taking or injury, the act of
the state agency is unauthorized and unlawful and is not the act
of the State of Colorado. i
A qualified mandamus has been granted in one case. In Haase V.
City of Memphis7 2 the court held that it would issue mandamus to
compel institution of proceedings if the city did not bring a condemna-
tion suit within thirty days. This remedy is very similar to the qual-
ified injunction previously discussed.73
V. EJECTMENT
The landowner's suit in ejectment closely resembles the injunction
in ultimate effect. In neither action is the landowner given compensa-
tion; the appropriating body is simply prohibited from maintaining
possession. If the public is benefiting from a particular use of prop-
erty, ejectment, like an injunction, would cause that use to discon-
tinue with possible harm to the public. Although such relief is some-
times granted 7 4 it is more often denied 7 5 usually because of the pos-
70. 207 F.2d 50 (10th Cir. 1953).
71. Id. at 57.
72. 149 Tenn. 235, 259 S.W. 545 (1924).
73. See text accompanying notes 43-50 supra.
74. Green v. City of Tacoma, 51 Fed. 622 (C.C.W.D. Wash. 1892); Mitchell v.
Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 265 Ill. 300, 106 N.E. 833 (1914); Daniels v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 35 Iowa 129 (1872); Weyler v. Gibson, 110 Md. 636, 73 Atl. 261 (Ct.
App. 1909); Barker v. St. Louis County, 340 Mo. 986, 104 S.W.2d 371 (1937);
Connellsville Gas Coal Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 216 Pa. 309, 65 Atl. 669 (1907).
See also Stuart v. Colorado E. Ry., 61 Colo. 58, 156 Pac. 152 (1916); Clark v.
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sible harmful effect upon the public welfare.7 1 Ejectment also has
been denied because a landowner has other remedies available.77
Some states have an exclusive statutory remedy which prohibits an
action in ejectment and all other forms of relief not expressly
granted.78 In a few jurisdictions, ejectment has been allowed even
when there were other remedies available.79
A small numbr of cases have either granted or said they were will-
ing to grant a "qualified" ejectment.8° The effect would be almost
identical to that of a "qualified" injunction. It might be argued that
any injunction or judgment in ejectment in these cases is qualified,
because theoretically, after the relief is given, the taking body can
Wabash Ry., 132 Iowa 11, 109 N.W. 309 (1906); McGinnis v. Wabash Ry., 114
N.W. 1039 (Iowa 1908); Beetschen v. Shell Pipe Line Corp., 248 S.W.2d 66 (Mo.
1952); State ex rel. Roberts v. Eicher, 178 S.W. 171 (Mo. 1915); Menge v. Morris
& E. Ry., 73 N.J. Eq. 177, 67 Atl. 1028 (Ch. 1907)); Hyde v. Minnesota D. & P.
Ry., 24 S.D. 386, 123 N.W. 849 (1909).
75. Cairo & Fulton R.R. v. Turner, 31 Ark. 494 (1876); Strickler v. Midland
By., 125 Ind. 412, 25 N.E. 455 (1890); Louisville N.A. & C. Ry. v. Soltweddle,
116 Ind. 257, 19 N.E. 111 (1888) ; St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Yount, 67 Kan. 396, 73
Pac. 63 (1903); Thomson v. State Highway Comm'r, 10 N.J. Misc. 877, 161 Atl.
192 (Sup. Ct. 1932); Beasley v. Aberdeen & R.R., 147 N.C. 362, 61 S.E. 453
(1908); Saunders v. Memphis & R.S. Ry., 101 Tenn. 206, 47 S.W. 155 (1898);
Carter v. Mayor of City of Chattanooga, 48 S.W. 117 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1897). See
also Dunnebacke v. Detroit G.H. & M. Ry., 248 Mich. 450, 227 N.W. 811 (1929);
Empire Trust Co. v. Board of Commerce & Nav., 124 N.J.L. 406, 11 A.2d 752
(Sup. Ct. 1940) ; McDowell v. City of Asheville, 112 N.C. 747, 17 S.E. 537 (1893) ;
Belton v. Wateree Power Co., 123 S.C. 291, 115 S.E. 587 (1922); Cayce Land Co.
v. Southern By., 111 S.C. 115, 96 S.E. 725 (1918); Knoxville Ry. & Light Co. v.
O'Fallen, 130 Tenn. 270, 170 S.W. 55 (1914); Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v.
Paint Rock Flume & Transp. Co., 128 Tenn. 277, 160 S.E. 522 (1913).
76. Strickler v. Midland Ry., supra note 75; St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Yount,
supra note 75; Empire Trust Co. v. Board of Commerce & Nay., supra note 75.
77. McKennon v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry., 69 Ark. 104, 61 S.W. 383 (1901);
Cairo & F. R.R. v. Turner, 31 Ark. 494 (1876); Beasley v. Aberdeen & R. R.R.,
147 N.C. 362, 61 S.E. 453 (1908); Doty v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 123 Tenn.
329, 130 S.W. 1053 (1910); Saunders v. Memphis & R.S. Ry., 101 Tenn. 206, 47
S.W. 155 (1898).
78. McKennon v. St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry., supra note 77; Cairo & F. R.R. v.
Turner, supra note 77; Doty v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., supra note 77.
79. Mitchell v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 265 Ill. 300, 106 N.E. 833 (1914);
McGinnis v. Wabash R.R., 114 N.W. 1039 (Iowa 1908); Clark v. Wabash R.R.,
132 Iowa 11, 109 N.W. 309 (1906); Daniels v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 35 Iowa 129
(1872); Beetschen v. Shell Pipe Line Corp., 248 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952);
Menge v. Morris & E. R.R., 73 N.J. Eq. 177, 67 Atl. 1028 (Ch. 1907); Hyde v.
Minnesota D. & P. By., 24 S.D. 386, 123 N.W. 849 (1909).
80. Stuart v. Colorado E. R.R., 61 Colo. 58, 156 Pac. 152 (1916); Weyler v.
Gibson, 110 Md. 636, 73 Atl. 261 (Ct. App. 1909); Connellsville Gas Coal Co., v.
Baltimore & 0. R.R., 216 Pa. 309, 65 Atl. 669 (1907); Caruthers v. Peoples Natural
Gas Co., 155 Pa. Super. 332, 38 A.2d 713 (1944).
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condemn the property as it should have done in the first place. But
there might be some question whether an unqualified injunction or
ejectment precluded the appropriating body from later condemning
the property. The court that grants qualified relief definitely leaves
the door open for the taking body to institute proper proceedings.
VI. TORT
When a landowner brings a suit to obtain monetary relief against
a body taking his land, it is not always an easy matter to analyze the
suit and determine whether it sounds in tort. Many of the cases cited
within this section of the note as sounding in tort may not so appear
to the reader. On the other hand, perhaps other cases should have
been cited. The problem is caused to some extent by the modern
tendency not to differentiate among civil actionsA1 Outside observers
are not alone in their confusion. Decisions and opinions indicate that
the courts have the same difficulty32 Some courts avoid the problem
by simply awarding "common law" relief (whatever that may be) .83
Other courts appear to grant damages on a combined analysis of "just
compensation" (whatever that may be) and tort.84 Relief based
81. The following cases indicate the problem of analyzing cases: Perkerson
v. State Highway Bd., 56 Ga. App. 316, 192 S.E. 475 (1937), rev'd on other
grounds, 185 Ga. 617, 196 S.E. 42 (1938); Prickett v. Belvue Drainage Dist., 159
Kan. 136, 152 P.2d 870 (1944); State Park Comm'n v. Wilder, 260 Ky. 190, 84
S.W.2d 38 (Ct. App. 1935); Bernard v. State Dept. of Pub. Works, 127 So. 2d
774 (La. Ct. App. 1961); Vaughn v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 89 S.W.2d 699
(Mo. Ct. App. 1935); Summerford v. Board of Comm'rs, 35 N.M. 374, 298 Pac.
410 (1931) ; Sale v. State Highway & Pub. Works Conim'n, 242 N.C. 612, 89 S.E.2d
290 (1955) ; Eller v. Board of Educ., 242 N.C. 584, 89 S.E.2d 144 (1955) ; Moore
v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 163 N.C. 300, 79 S.E. 596 (1913); Beck v. Lane
County, 141 Ore. 580, 18 P.2d 594 (1933); Moseley v. Highway Dep't, 236 S.C.
499, 115 S.E.2d 172 (1960); Chick Springs Water Co. v. Highway Dep't, 159 S.C.
481, 157 S.E. 842 (1931); Cayce Land Co. v. Southern Ry., 111 S.C. 115, 96 S.E.
725 (1918) ; Piercy v. Johnson City, 130 Tenn. 231, 169 S.W. 765 (1914) ; Frater
v. Hamilton County, 90 Tenn. 661, 19 S.W. 233 (1891) ; Virginia Hot Springs Co.
v. Lowman, 126 Va. 424, 101 S.E. 326 (1919); Great No. Ry. v. State, 102 Wash.
348, 173 Pac. 40 (1918).
82. Isham v. Board of Comm'rs, 126 Kan. 6, 266 Pac. 655 (1928); Harlan
County v. Cole, 218 Ky. 819, 292 S.W. 501 (1927); Summerford v. Board of
Comm'rs, supra note 81; Moore v. Carolina Power & Light Co., supra note 81;
Moseley v. Highway Dep't, supra note 81.
83. Vaughn v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 89 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. Ct. App. 1935);
Sale v. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 242 N.C. 612, 89 S.E.2d 290 (1955) ;
Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Dep't, 159 S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842
(1931); Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Lowman, 126 Va. 424, 101 S.E. 326 (1919).
See text accompanying notes 149-62 infra.
84. Bernard v. State Dep't of Pub. Works, 127 So. 2d 774 (La. Ct. App. 1961);
Eller v. Board of Educ., 242 N.C. 584, 89 S.E.2d 144 (1955); Sale v. State High-
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upon an action for "just compensation" includes many cases and is
sufficiently different from tort to warrant its discussion in another
category of remedies.85
An action sounding in tort may appear to be the most logical rem-
edy for a property owner. This is particularly true if it is the un-
compensated taking of the land that is deemed the wrong.88 If the
taking is the basis of the suit, then it logically follows that permanent
damages should be given for the tort. For most takings, trespass is
the appropriate theory,2 though nuisance seems an equally valid
way & Pub. Works Comm'n, supra note 83; Frater v. Hamilton County, 90 Tenn.
661, 19 S.W. 233 (1891) ; and see text accompanying notes 149-62 infra.
85. See text accompanying note 129 infra.
86. Archer v. Board of Levee Inspectors, 128 Fed. 125 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1904);
McCullough v. City of Denver, 39 Fed. 307 (C.C.D. Colo. 1889); Cotton Land Co.
v. United States, 109 Ct. Cl. 816, 75 F. Supp. 232 (1948) ; Hunter v. City of Mobile,
244 Ala. 318, 13 So. 2d 656 (1943) ; Hogge v. Drainage Dist. Number 7, 181 Ark.
564, 26 S.W.2d 887 (1930); Newberry v. Evans, 97 Cal. App. 120, 275 Pac. 465
(1929) ; Sternes v. Sutter Butte Canal Co., 61 Cal. App. 737, 216 Pae. 66 (1923) ;
East Fla. Tel. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 85 Fla. 378, 96 So. 95 (1923) ; Grune-
wald v. City of Chicago, 371 Ill. 528, 21 N.E.2d 739 (1939); Springer v. City of
Chicago, 308 Ill. 356, 139 N.E. 414 (1923) ; Strickler v. Midland Ry., 125 Ind. 412,
25 N.E. 455 (1890); Bernard v. State Dep't of Pub. Works, 127 So. 2d 774 (La.
Ct. App. 1961); Adams v. Town of Ruston, 9 La. App. 603, 121 So. 768 (1928);
Pratt v. Saline Valley Ry., 130 Mo. App. 175, 108 S.W. 1099 (1908); Bridge v.
City of Lincoln, 138 Neb. 461, 293 N.W. 375 (1940); Country of Douglas v.
Taylor, 50 Neb. 535, 70 N.W. 27 (1897) ; Spencer v. Connecticut River Power Co., 78
N.H. 468, 101 Atl. 528 (1917) ; Erie County v. Friedenberg, 96 Misc. 222, 159 N.Y.
Supp. 913 (Sup. Ct. 1916); Westphal v. City of New York, 34 Misc. 684, 70 N.Y.
Supp. 1021 (Sup. Ct. 1901); McMahan v. Black Mountain Ry., 170 N.C. 456, 87
S.E. 237 (1915) ; Beck v. Lane County, 141 Ore. 580, 18 P.2d 594 (1933) ; Kerns v.
Couch, 141 Ore. 147, 12 P.2d 1011 (1932); Theiler v. Tillamook County, 75 Ore.
214, 146 Pac. 828 (1915) ; Cochran Coal Co. v. Municipal Management Co., 380 Pa.
397, 110 A.2d 345 (1955); Hardin v. City of Greenville, 161 S.C. 53, 159 S.E. 465
(1931); Farr v. Steele, 128 S.C. 293, 121 S.E. 792 (1924); Belton v. Wateree
Power Co., 123 S.C. 291, 115 S.E. 587 (1922); Cayce Land Co. v. Southern Ry.,
111 S.C. 115, 96 S.E. 725 (1918); Hyde v. Minnesota D. & P. Ry., 24 S.D. 386,
123 N.W. 849 (1909); Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Paint Rock Flume & Transp.
Co., 128 Tenn. 277, 160 S.W. 522 (1913); Saunders v. Memphis & R.S.Ry., 101
Tenn. 206, 47 S.W. 155 (1898); Carter v. Mayor of City of Chattanooga, 48 S.W.
117 (Tenn. Ch. 1897) ; Henderson v. City of Longview, 111 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1937); Peterson v. Bean, 22 Utah 43, 61 Pac. 213 (1900); Griswold v.
Town School Dis't, 117 Vt. 224, 88 A.2d 829 (1952) ; Nelson County v. Loving, 126
Va. 283, 101 S.E. 406 (1919); Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Lowman, 126 Va. 424,
101 S.D. 326 (1919); Irwin v. J. K. Lumber Co., 102 Wash. 99, 172 Pac. 911
(1918).
87. Newberry v. Evans, supra note 86; Erie County v. Friedenberg, aupra note
86; Theiler v. Tillamook County, supra note 86; Cochran Coal Co. v. Municipal
Management Co., supra note 86; Belton v. Wateree Power Co., supra note 86;
Peterson v. Bean, supra note 86.
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basis for an action. 88 Many courts adopt either the trespass or nui-
sance theory and award damages for a wrongful taking.89 When the
landowner has received damages, he has in effect ratified the taking,
and the appropriating body is then allowed to retain use and posses-
sion of the property.90 In some cases, although relief in tort is not
in fact granted, courts have indicated that under proper circum-
stances an action sounding in tort could be maintained.91
88. See Vaughn v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 89 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. Ct. App.
1935).
89. Archer v. Board of Levee Inspectors, 128 Fed. 125 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1904);
Cotton Land Co. v. United States, 109 Ct. Cl. 816, 75 F. Supp. 232 (1948); Hogge
v. Drainage Dist. Number 7, 181 Ark. 564, 26 S.W.2d 887 (1930); Newberry v.
Evans, 97 Cal. App. 120, 275 Pac. 465 (1929); Pratt v. Saline Valley Ry., 130 Mo.
App. 175, 108 S.W. 1099 (1908); Erie County v. Friedenberg, 96 Misc. 222, 159
N.Y. Supp. 913 (Sup. Ct. 1916); Westphal v. City of New York, 34 Misc. 684,
70 N.Y. Supp. 1021 (Sup. Ct. 1901); McMahan v. Black Mountain Ry., 170 N.C.
456, 87 S.E. 237 (1915); Theiler v. Tillamook County, 75 Ore. 214, 146 Pac. 828
(1915); Cochran Coal Co. v. Municipal Management Co., 380 Pa. 397, 110 A.2d
345 (1955); Hardin v. City of Greenville, 161 S.C. 53, 159 S.E. 465 (1931);
Peterson v. Bean, 22 Utah 43, 61 Pac. 213 (1900); Griswold v. Town School Dis't,
117 Vt. 224, 88 A.2d 829 (1952).
90. Newberry v. Evans, supra note 89.
91. Snowden v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 238 Fed. 495 (8th Cir. 1916); Chilcutt v.
United States, 64 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Ky. 1946) ; McCullough v. City of Denver, 39
Fed. 307 (C.C.D. Colo. 1889); Hunter v. City of Mobile, 244 Ala. 318, 13 So. 2d
656 (1943); Cannon v. Felsenthal, 180 Ark. 1075, 24 S.W.2d 856 (1930); Mc-
Laughlin v. City of Hope, 107 Ark. 442, 155 S.W. 910 (1913); Sternes v. Sutter
Butte Canal Co., 61 Cal. App. 737, 216 Pac. 66 (1923); East Fla. Tel. Co. v. Sea-
board Air Line Ry., 85 Fla. 378, 96 So. 95 (1923) ; Grunewald v. City of Chicago,
371 Ill. 528, 21 N.E.2d 739 (1939) ; Springer v. City of Chicago, 308 Ill. 356, 139
N.E. 414 (1923); Strickler v. Midland Ry., 125 Ind. 412, 25 N.E. 455 (1890);
Clark v. Wabash R.R., 132 Iowa 11, 109 N.W. 309 (1906); Bushart v. County of
Fulton, 183 Ky. 471, 209 S.W. 499 (1919) ; Bernard v. State Dep't of Pub. Works,
127 So. 2d 774 (La. Ct. App. 1961); Adams v. Town of Ruston, 9 La. App. 603,
121 So. 768 (1928); Preston v. City of Newton, 213 Mass. 483, 100 N.E. 641
(1913) ; Thompson v. City of Winona, 96 Miss. 591, 51 So. 129 (1910) ; Beetschen
v. Shell Pipe Line Corp., 248 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); Vaughn v. Missouri
Power & Light Co., 89 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. Ct. App. 1935); Bridge v. City of Lincoln,
138 Neb. 461, 293 N.W. 375 (1940); Spencer v. Connecticut River Power Co., 78
N.H. 468, 101 Atl. 528 (1917); Blackwell, Enid & S.W. Ry. v. Bebout, 19 Okla. 63,
91 Pac. 877 (1907) ; Beck v. Lane County, 141 Ore. 580, 18 P.2d 594 (1933); Kerns
v. Couch, 141 Ore. 147, 12 P.2d 1011 (1932) ; Moseley v. Highway Dep't, 236 S.C.
499, 115 S.E.2d 172 (1960); Farr v. Steele, 128 S.C. 293, 121 S.E. 792 (1924);
Belton v. Wateree Power Co., 123 S.C. 291, 115 S.E. 587 (1922); Cayce Land Co.
v. Southern Ry., 111 S.C. 115, 96 S.E. 725 (1918) ; Hyde v. Minnesota, D. & P. Ry.,
24 S.D. 386, 123 N.W. 849 (1909); Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Paint Rock
Flume & Transp. Co., 128 Tenn. 277, 160 S.W. 522 (1913) ; Saunders v. Memphis
& R.S. Ry., 101 Tenn. 206, 47 S.W. 155 (1898); Frater v. Hamilton County, 90
Tenn. 661, 19 S.W. 233 (1891); Carter v. Mayor of City of Chattanooga, 48 S.W.
117 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1897); Kahn v. City of Houston, 121 Tex. 293, 48 S.W.2d
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The tort theory of recovery often has been held to be inappropri-
ate.9 2 In many cases the wrongful act is held to be the failure to
compensate rather than the taking itself, 3 and courts in these cases
595 (1932); Henderson v. City of Longview, 111 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937); Barbogiio v. Gibson, 61 Utah 314, 213 Pac. 385 (1923); Salt Lake Inv. Co.
v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 46 Utah 203, 148 Pac. 439 (1914); Nelson County v.
Loving, 126 Va. 283, 101 S.E. 406 (1919); Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Lowman,
126 Va. 424, 101 S.E. 326 (1919); Soko v. Department of Labor and Indus., 181
Wash. 153, 45 P.2d 30 (1935); Irwin v. J. K. Lumber Co., 102 Wash. 99, 172 Pac.
911 (1918); State ex rel. Whitten v. City of Spokane, 92 Wash. 667, 159 Pac.
805 (1916).
92. Klebe v. United States, 263 U.S. 188 (1923); Pacific Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v.
T.V.A., 89 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Va. 1950); State v. Colorado Postal Tel.-Cable
Co., 104 Colo. 436, 91 P.2d 481 (1939); Brown v. Davis County, 196 Iowa 1341,
195 N.W. 363 (1923); Isham v. Board of Comm'rs, 126 Kan. 6, 266 Pac. 655
(1928) ; City of Hazard v. Eversole, 237 Ky. 242, 35 S.W.2d 313 (1931) ; Glick-
man v. Commonwealth, 244 Mass. 148, 138 N.E. 252 (1923) ; Haycock v. Jannarone,
99 N.J.L. 183, 122 Atl. 805 (Ct. Err. & App. 1923) ; Moore v. Clark, 235 N.C. 364,
70 S.E.2d 182 (1952); McKinney v. State Highway Comm'n, 192 N.C. 670, 135
S.E. 772 (1926); Mayer v. Studer & Manion Co., 66 N.D. 190, 262 N.W. 925
(1935); Kunkle v. Borough of Ford City, 305 Pa. 416, 158 Atl. 159 (1931);
Garraux v. City Council, 53 S.C. 575, 31 S.E. 597 (1898); Phillips v. Marion
County, 166 Tenn. 83, 59 S.W.2d 507 (1933); Bexar Metropolitan Water Dist. v.
Kuntscher, 274 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Benka v. Consolidated Water
Power Co., 198 Wis. 472, 224 N.W. 718 (1929).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1948) originally enacted as the TUCKER ACT, 24 STAT.
505 (1887). See also Connell v. Algonquin Gas Transmission Co., 174 F. Supp.
453 (D.R.I. 1959); Coates v. United States, 117 Ct. Cl. 795, 93 F. Supp. 637
(1950); Merriam v. United States, 29 Ct. Cl. 250 (1894); Bacich v. Board of
Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943) ; Holt v. County of Cook, 284 Ill. App.
48, 1 N.E.2d 264 (1936); Prickett v. Belvue Drainage Dist., 159 Kan. 136, 152
P.2d 870 (1944) ; State Highway Comm'n v. Puskarich, 148 Kan. 388, 83 P.2d 132
(1938) ; Webb v. Board of Comm'rs, 127 Kan. 547, 274 Pac. 249 (1929) ; Harlan
County v. Cole, 218 Ky. 819, 292 S.W. 501 (1927); Turner v. Missouri Pac. Ry.,
130 Mo. App. 535, 109 S.W. 101 (1908) ; Thomson v. State Highway Comm'n, 10
N.J. Misc. 877, 161 Atl. 192 (Sup. Ct. 1932) ; Brown v. Murphy, 136 N.J.L. 183, 54
A.2d 764 (Ct. Err. & App. 1947); Sale v. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n,
242 N.C. 612, 89 S.E.2d 290 (1955); Eller v. Board of Educ., 242 N.C. 584, 89
S.E.2d 144 (1955); Beasley v. Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R., 147 N.C. 362, 61 S.E.
453 (1908) ; Jacobson v. State, 68 N.D. 259, 278 N.W. 652 (1938) ; City of Okla. v.
Daly, 316 P.2d 129 (Okla. 1957) ; Oklahoma City v. Wells, 185 Okla. 369, 91 P.2d
1077 (1939) ; Parish v. Town of Yorkville, 96 S.C. 24, 79 S.E. 635 (1913) ; State v.
Malone, 168 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943); City of Jasper v. Brown, 39
S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Great No. Ry. v. State, 102 Wash. 348, 173
Pac. 40 (1918) ; Lambert v. County Court, 103 W. Va. 37, 136 S.E. 507 (1927);
Cronin v. Janesville Traction Co., 163 Wis. 436, 158 N.W. 254 (1916).
93. Coates v. United States, supra note 92; Merriam v. United States, supra
note 92; Bacich v. Board of Control, supra note 92; State Highway Comm'n v.
Puskarich, supra note 92; Webb v. Board of Comm'rs, supra note 92; City of
Hazard v. Eversole, supra note 92; Turner v. Missouri Pac. Ry., mpra note 92;
Eller v. Board of Educ., supra note 92; Moore v. Clark, supra note 92; Jacobson v.
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stress that the landowner should seek compensation rather than dam-
ages. Since the appropriating body has the power of eminent domain
and presumably has taken the land without malice and for the good
of the public, the only wrongful act is the failure to compensate. The
landowner's remedy is therefore logically not in tort, but rather in
an action to recover compensation.
Tort relief is often denied for other than theoretical reasons. When
the landowner has a statutory remedy, courts often hold that the
relief in tort is excluded.' 4 The general rule that governmental en-
tities are immune from suits sounding in tort"5 is followed in many
of the land appropriation cases.98 However, when property is taken
without compensation, many jurisdictions will not allow the defense
of governmental immunity. 7 Constitutional provisions that prohibit
State, supra note 92; Mayer v. Studer & Manion Co., supra note 92; City of Okla.
City v. Daly, supra note 92; Parish v. Town of Yorkville, supra note 92; State v.
Malone, supra note 92; Great No. Ry. v. State, supra note 92; Cronin v. Janesville
Traction Co., supra note 92; Kuhl v. Chicago N.W. Ry., 101 Wis. 42, 77 N.W.
155 (1898).
94. Connell v. Algonquin Gas Transmission Co., 174 F. Supp. 453 (D.R.I. 1959);
Preston v. City of Newton, 213 Mass. 483, 100 N.E. 641 (1913); Moore v. Clark,
235 N.C. 364, 70 S.E.2d 182 (1952); MeKinney v. State Highway Comm'n, 192
N.C. 670, 135 S.E. 772 (1926) ; Beasley v. Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R., 147 N.C. 362,
61 S.E. 453 (1908); Kunkle v. Borough of Ford City, 305 Pa. 416, 158 AtI. 159
(1931) ; Garraux v. City Council, 53 S.C. 575, 31 S.E. 597 (1898) ; Benka v. Consol.
Water Power Co., 198 Wis. 472, 224 N.W. 718 (1929); Cronin v. Janesville Trac-
tion Co., 163 Wis. 436, 158 N.W. 254 (1916). Contra, Pratt v. Saline Valley Ry.,
130 Mo. App. 175, 108 S.W. 1099 (1908); McMahan v. Black Mountain Ry., 170
N.C. 456, 87 S.E. 237 (1915); Cochran Coal Co. v. Municipal Management Co.,
380 Pa. 397, 110 A.2d 345 (1955).
95. 52 AM. JuR. Torts § 100 (1944).
96. Colorado ex rel. Watrous v. District Court, 207 F.2d 50 (10th Cir. 1953);
Bryant v. State Highway Comm'n, 342 S.W.2d 415 (Ark. 1961); State v. Colorado
Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 104 Colo. 436, 91 P.2d 481 (1939); Holt v. County of Cook,
284 Ill. App. 48, 1 N.E.2d 264 (1936); Brown v. Davis County, 196 Iowa 1341,
195 N.W. 363 (1923); Isham v. Board of Comm'rs, 126 Kan. 6, 266 Pac. 655
(1928); Mayer v. Studer & Manion Co., 66 N.D. 190, 262 N.W. 925 (1935);
Parish v. Town of Yorkville, 96 S.C. 24, 79 S.E. 635 (1913); Phillips v. Marion
County, 166 Tenn. 83, 59 S.W.2d 507 (1933); Bexar Metropolitan Water Dist. v.
Kuntscher, 274 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Lambert v. McDowell County
Court, 103 W. Va. 37, 136 S.E. 507 (1927).
97. Hunter v. City of Mobile, 244 Ala. 318, 13 So. 2d 656 (1943); Hogge v.
Drainage Dist. Number 7, 181 Ark. 564, 26 S.W.2d 887 (1930) ; Perkerson v. State
Highway Bd., 56 Ga. App. 316, 192 S.E. 475 (1937), rev'd on other grounds,
185 Ga. 617, 196 S.E. 42 (1938) ; Douglas County v. Taylor, 50 Neb. 535, 70 N.W.
27 (1897); County of Erie v. Friedenberg, 96 Misc. 222, 159 N.Y. Supp. 913
(Sup. Ct. 1916) ; Theiler v. Tillamook County, 75 Ore. 214, 146 Pac. 828 (1915) ;
Cochran Coal Co. v. Municipal Management Co., 380 Pa. 397, 110 A.2d 345 (1955);
Moseley v. Highway Dep't, 236 S.C. 499, 115 S.E.2d 172 (1960); Chick Springs
Water Co. v. State Highway Dep't, 159 S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842 (1930) ; Griswold v.
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the taking of property without compensation can also serve as a basis
for a waiver of immunity.,8
Most actions against the federal government for property taken
without compensation are founded upon the Tucker Act.0 Such
claims are based either upon a constitutional right or an implied con-
tract.10 In Merriam v. United States,' the court held that a contract
can be implied whenever the government acknowledges either ex-
plicitly or tacitly that it is taking private property without claim of
title. Since the United States can take land under its inherent power of
eminent domain, 0 2 the court reasoned that there had been no wrong-
ful taking, and therefore no tort. Some fifty-four years later, in a
fact situation almost identical to the Merriam case (erection of dam
by government caused flooding of private property), the court held
that the action did sound in tort,0 3 and granted relief under the Tucker
Act even though the Act excluded relief for actions in tort,104 on the
ground that the claim was based upon the constitution. However, most
cases against the government are based upon contract rather than
tort. 105
VII. IMPLIED CONTRACTOG
A form of relief used in a few jurisdictions is based upon contract.
There is, of course, no express contract when an appropriating body
takes property without compensating the owner. However, some
courts imply a contract on the basis of the constitutional °7 or statu-
Town School Dist. 117 Vt. 224, 88 A.2d 829 (1952); State ex rel. Slade v. Jones,
182 Wash. 94, 45 P.2d 30 (1935).
98. Hunter v. City of Mobile, supra note 97; Hogge v. Drainage Dist. Number
7, supra note 97; Perkerson v. State Highway Bd., supra note 97; Douglas County
v. Taylor, 50 Neb. 535, 70 N.W. 27 (1897); Moseley v. Highway Dep't, supra
note 97; Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Dep't, supra note 97; Gris-
wold v. Town School Dist., supra note 97.
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1948).
100. See text accompanying notes 163-81 infra.
101. 29 Ct. Cl. 250 (1894).
102. Id. at 257. See also United States v. A Certain Tract or Parcel of Land,
44 F. Supp. 712 (S.D. Ga. 1942); United States v. 8,557.16 Acres of Land, 11
F. Supp. 311 (N.D. W.Va. 1935).
103. Cotton Land Co. v. United States, 109 Ct. Cl. 816 (1948).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1948).
105. See text accompanying notes 163-81 infra.
106. The term implied contract as used in this note refers to an implied in law
rather than an implied in fact contract.
107. Hunter v. City of Mobile, 244 Ala. 318, 13 So. 2d 656 (1943); State Road
Dep't v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, 1 So. 2d 868 (1941); County of Hillsborough v.
Kensett, 107 Fla. 237, 144 So. 393 (1932); Boise Valley Constr. Co. v. Kroeger,
17 Idaho 384, 105 Pac. 1070 (1909); Mayer v. Studer & Manion Co., 66 N.D. 190,
262 N.W. 925 (1935); City of Okla. City v. Daly, 316 P.2d 129 (Okla. 1957);
Kuhl v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 101 Wis. 42, 77 N.W. 155 (1898).
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tory0 8 requirements of paying just compensation for expropriated
property. In an action sounding in contract, the failure to compensate
is the wrong rather than the taking itself. The emphasis the implied
contract theory places on the failure to compensate is evident in
Jacobson v. State,20 9 where the court stated:
Plaintiff does not claim the defendants had no right to change
the grade. When they did so the result cannot be said to be a
trespass, even though injury is done to the property. It becomes,
if anything, a taking or appropriation of property for public
use, and the State or a municipality, in taking private property
for public use, acts in its sovereign capacity, and not as a tres-
passer. What is recovered is "compensation," which presupposes
a contract, expressed or implied. It is not damages in the strict
sense of the word." 0
Federal decisions which will be shown in greater detail later in
this note, rely heavily on the implied contract theory."' Only a few
state jurisdictions have used it as a basis for allowing recovery." 2
It has the advantage over the tort theories in that in some states it
circumvents the state's immunity from suit for torts.' 3 The extent to
108. Boise Valley Constr. Co. v. Kroeger, supra note 107; Mayer v. Studer &
Manion Co., supra note 107; Kuh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., supra note 107.
109. 68 N.D. 259, 278 N.W. 652 (1938).
110. Id. at 262, 278 N.W. at 653.
111. See text accompanying notes 163-81 infra.
112. State Road Dep't v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, 1 So. 2d 868 (1941); Housing
Authority v. Savannah Iron & Wire Works, Inc., 90 Ga. App. 150, 82 S.E.2d 244
(1954) ; Dugger v. State Highway Comm'n, 185 Kan. 317, 342 P.2d 186 (1959);
Webb v. Board of County Comm'rs, 127 Kan. 547, 274 Pac. 249 (1929) ; Jacobson
v. State, 68 N.D. 259, 278 N.W. 652 (1938) ; City of Okla. City v. Daly, 316 P.2d
129 (Okla. 1957); Kerns v. Couch, 141 Ore. 147, 12 P.2d 1011 (1932). See also
Hunter v. City of Mobile, 244 Ala. 318, 13 So. 2d 656 (1943); Stanton v. Morgan,
127 Fla. 34, 172 So. 485 (1937) ; County of Hillsborough v. Kensett, 107 Fla 237,
144 So. 393 (1932); Boise Valley Constr. Co. v. Kroeger, 17 Idaho 384, 105 Pac.
1070 (1909); Holt v. County of Cook, 284 Ill. App. 48, 1 N.E.2d 264 (1936);
Atchison v. State Highway Comm'n, 161 Kan. 661, 171 P.2d 287 (1946); State
Highway Comm'n v. Puskarich, 148 Kan. 388, 83 P.2d 132 (1938); Mayer v.
Studer & Manion Co., 66 N.D. 190, 262 N.W. 925 (1935) ; Nelson County v. Loving,
126 Va. 283, 101 S.E. 406 (1919); Peters v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 165 Wis. 529,
162 N.W. 916 (1917) ; Pabst Brewing Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 157 Wis. 158, 147
N.W. 46 (1914) ; Kuhl v. Chicago & N.W. !y., 101 Wis. 42, 77 N.W. 155 (1898).
See contra, other courts that seem to deny contract as a theory for granting
relief, Sale v. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 242 N.C. 612, 89 S.E.2d 290
(1955) and cases cited under inverse condemnation. See 2 NICHOLs, EMINENT
DOMAIN § 468, at 1237 (2d ed. 1917) where he indicates by the following quote
that implied contract will not lie. "A common law action of indebitatus assumpsit
for the value of the land taken will not lie, for there is no implied contract to pay
for it except in the manner provided by statute."
113. Holt v. County of Cook, supra note 112; Webb v. Board of County Comm'rs,
supra note 112; Mayer v. Studer & Manion Co., supra note 112. See contra, State
v. Colorado Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 104 Colo. 436, 91 P.2d 481 (1939).
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which this theory influences the courts may be greater than appears
on the face of the reports, for there is an unjust enrichment in the
land appropriation cases. It may well be that the notion of an implied
contract underlies the theory of many courts that say they are giving
common law relief. 14
VIII. INVERSE CONDEMNATION
A proceeding in inverse condemnation, or reverse condemnation as
it is sometimes called, bears no theoretical similarity to any of the
common law actions. It is not based on contract115 or tort.11 Since a
condemnation proceeding is not technically a civil action and is not a
suit at law or in equity, it logically follows that an inverse condemna-
tion suit is also not a civil action and not a suit at law or in equity.
An inverse condemnation suit like a normal condemnation suit is a
special proceeding.
The inverse condemnation procedure is a basis for relief in many
jurisdictions.127 The theory is that since the taking body has failed to
114. See text accompanying notes 149-62 infra.
115. State v. Leeson, 84 Ariz. 44, 323 P.2d 692 (1958); Bacich v. Board of
Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1944) ; Renninger v. State, 70 Idaho 170,
213 P.2d 911 (1950); Ferrell v. State Highway Comm'n, 252 N.C. 830, 115 S.E.2d
34 (1960) ; Oklahoma City v. Wells, 185 Okla. 369, 91 P.2d 1077 (1939) ; Cronin v.
Janesville Traction Co., 163 Wis. 436, 158 N.W. 254 (1916).
116. State v. Leeson, supra note 115; Bacich v. Board of Control, supra note
115; Ferrell v. State Highway Comm'n, supra note 115. See Rose v. State, 19 Cal.
2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942).
117. Pima County v. Bilby, 87 Ariz. 366, 351 P.2d 647 (1960); State v. Leeson,
supra note 115; Bellman v. County of Contra Costa, 54 Cal. 2d 363, 353 P.2d 300
(1960); Bauer v. County of Ventura, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955) ; Bacich v.
Board of Control, supra note 115; Rose v. State, supra note 116; Podesta v. Linden
Irr. Dist., 141 Cal. App. 2d 38, 296 P.2d 401 (1956) ; State v. Marion Circuit Court,
238 Ind. 637, 153 N.E.2d 327 (1958) ; Vandalia Coal Co. v. Indianapolis & L. Ry.,
168 Ind. 144, 79 N.E. 1082 (1907) ; Keck v. Hafley, 237 S.W.2d 527 (Ky. 1951) ;
Leslie County v. Davidson, 270 Ky. 705, 110 S.W.2d 652 (1937); Moore v. Clark,
235 N.C. 364, 70 S.E.2d 182 (1952) ; Incorporated Town of Pittsburgh v. Cochrane,
200 Okla. 497, 197 P.2d 287 (1948); Oklahoma City v. Local Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 192 Okla. 188, 134 P.2d 565 (1943); Oklahoma City v. Wells, 184 Okla.
369, 91 P.2d 1077 (1939) ; Konrad v. State, 4 Wis. 2d 532, 91 N.W.2d 203 (1958) ;
Peterson v. Lake Superior Dist. Power Co., 255 Wis. 584, 39 N.W.2d 706 (1949).
See also cases in which inverse condemnation is indicated as valid relief. Maricopa
County Municipal Water Conser. Dist. Number I v. Warford, 69 Ariz. 1, 206 P.2d
1168 (1949); City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17
(1949); City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale, 23 Cal. 2d 68, 142 P.2d 289
(1943); Hillside Water Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 677, 76 P.2d 681
(1938); Churchill v. Kellstrom, 58 Cal. App. 2d 84, 136 P.2d 602 (1943); Strickler
v. Midland Ry., 125 Ind. 412, 25 N.E. 455 (1890); McGinnis v. Wabash R.R., 114
N.W. 1039 (Iowa 1908); Clark v. Wabash R.R., 132 Iowa 11, 109 N.W. 309
(1906); V.T.C. Lines v. City of Harlan, 313 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1957); O'Reilly v.
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institute condemnation proceedings, an action that has the effect of
instituting the proceedings is just. The result is that the landowner
receives the same amount of compensation as he would have received
if the appropriating body had instituted the proceedings. Although
inverse condemnation has the same effect as mandamus,118 the use of
it eliminates the need for the extraordinary writ.
Several jurisdictions have statutes setting forth the right of inverse
condemnation. 119 In some states the statutes grant this right gener-
ally. 120 In these jurisdictions the uncompensated property owner may
New York Elevated R.R., 148 N.Y. 347, 42 N.E. 1063 (1896); Ferrell v. State
Highway Conm'n, &apra note 115; Williams v. State Highway Comm'n, 252 N.C.
772, 114 S.E.2d 782 (1960); Proctor v. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n,
280 N.C. 687, 55 S.E.2d 479 (1949) ; Long v. City of Randleman, 199 N.C. 344, 154
S.E. 317 (1930); McKinney v. State Highway Comm'n, 192 N.C. 670, 135 S.E. 772
(1926); Bost v. Cabarrus County, 152 N.C. 531, 67 S.E. 1066 (1910); Gibbs v.
Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, 285 P.2d 190 (Okla. 1955); Morton v. Okmulgee
Producers & Mfrs. Gas Co., 207 Okla. 201, 248 P.2d 1028 (1952); Blackwell,
E. & S.W. Ry. v. Bebout, 19 Okla. 63, 91 Pac. 877 (1907) ; State Highway Comm'n
v. Stumbo, 222 Ore. 62, 352 P.2d 478 (1960); Coos Bay Oyster Co-op. v. State
Highway Comm'n, 219 Ore. 588, 348 P.2d 39 (1959); Fritts v. Leech, 201 Tenn. 18,
296 S.W.2d 834 (1956); Knoxville Ry. & Light Co. v. O'Fallen, 130 Tenn. 270,
170 S.W. 55 (1914) ; Saunders v. Memphis & R.S. Ry., 101 Tenn. 206, 47 S.W. 155
(1898); Peterson v. Wisconsin River Power Co., 264 Wis. 84, 58 N.W.2d 287
(1953); Olen v. Waupaca County, 238 Wis. 442, 300 N.W. 178 (1941); Benka v.
Consolidated Water Power Co., 198 Wis. 472, 224 N.W. 718 (1929); Price v.
Marinette & Menominee Paper Co., 197 Wis. 25, 221 N.W. 381 (1928); Cronin v.
Janesville Traction Co., 163 Wis. 436, 158 N.W. 254 (1916). Other cases, although
not termed inverse by the courts, are in their nature inverse and have the same
effect. Stuart v. Colorado E.R.R., 61 Colo. 58, 156 Pac. 152 (1916); Kentucky &
West Va. Power Co. v. Vanhoose, 295 Ky. 339, 174 S.W.2d 538 (1943); City of
Hazard v. Eversole, 237 Ky. 242, 35 S.W.2d 313 (1931); Harlan County v. Cole,
218 Ky. 819, 292 S.W. 501 (1927); McDonald v. Powell County, 199 Ky. 300,
250 S.W. 1007 (1923); Klein v. Commonwealth, 318 Mass. 592, 63 N.E.2d 360
(1945); Flint v. Town of Wilmington, 310 Mass. 66, 36 N.E.2d 905 (1941);
Broderick v. Department of Mental Diseases, 263 Mass. 124, 160 N.E. 404 (1928) ;
Hafey v. Commonwealth, 189 Mass. 540, 76 N.E. 208 (1905); State v. Messenger,
27 Minn. 119, 6 N.W. 457 (1880) ; Lewis v. City of Potosi, 317 S.W.2d 623, (Mo. Ct.
App. 1958); Richardson v. Board of Mississippi Levee Conm'rs, 77 Miss. 518, 26
So. 963 (1899) ; Jewell v. City of Rochester, 68 N.H. 603, 44 Atl. 134 (1895) ; Lucas
v. Carney, 167 Ohio St. 416, 149 N.E.2d 238 (1958) ; Frater v. Hamilton County,
90 Tenn. 661, 19 S.W. 233 (1891) ; State ex rel. Smith v. Board of Supervisors, 68
Wis. 502, 32 N.E. 228 (1887).
118. See text accompanying note 60-73 supra.
119. No attempt has been made to collect special statutes.
120. Wisconsin has an inverse statute which, although not necessarily typical,
will be cited in part. WIsc. STAT. ANN. § 32.10 (Supp. 1961) provides:
Whenever any property has been occupied by a body possessing the power
of condemnation but where such body has not exercised said power, the
owner, if he desires to institute condemnation proceedings, shall present a
verified petition to the circuit judge of the county wherein the land is situ-
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institute proceedings under the state statute whenever the appropriat-
ing body fails to do so if his property is taken without notice or with-
out his consent. Under such statutes, many cases hold that other
forms of relief are excluded. 1 ' Some jurisdictions allow inverse
proceedings only against private corporations. 122
The theory of awarding compensation in an action of inverse con-
demnation is applied even in some states that do not have applicable
statutes.12 3 California has consistently followed the policy of granting
inverse relief.2 4 In Bacich v. Board of ControJl26 the court held:
ated asking that such proceedings be commenced .... [T]he matter shall be
deemed an action at law and at issue, with petitioner as plaintiff and the
board, commission or corporation as defendant.
See the following statutes which also provide for inverse relief. IND. ANN. STAT.§ 3-1711 (1933); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 66-56 (1949); N. M. STAT. ANN. §
22-9-22 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-12 (1950), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-19 (1958);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 66, § 57 (1949); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1423 (1956). Even
though Oklahoma has a statute setting forth the inverse procedure, the court has
stated that the statute does not apply to cases of indirect takings. See State ex rol.
Dep't of Highways v. Keen, 354 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1960).
121. Ferrell v. State Highway Comm'n, 252 N.C. 830, 115 S.E.2d 34 (1960);
Williams v. State Highway Conn'n, 252 N.C. 772, 114 S.E.2d 782 (1960) ; Moore
v. Clark, 235 N.C. 364, 70 S.E.2d 182 (1952) ; Long v. City of Randleman, 199 N.C.
344, 154 S.E. 317 (1930) ; McKinney v. State Highway Comm'n, 192 N.C. 670, 135
S.E. 772 (1926); Bost v. Cabarrus County, 152 N.C. 531, 67 S.E. 1066 (1910);
Morton v. Okmulgee Producers & Mfrs. Gas Co., 207 Okla. 201, 248 P.2d 1028
(1952) ; Oklahoma City v. Wells, 185 Okla. 369, 91 P.2d 1077 (1939) ; Peterson v.
Lake Superior Dist. Power Co., 255 Wis. 584, 39 N.W.2d 706 (1949); Benka v.
Consolidated Water Power Co., 198 Wis. 472, 224 N.W. 718 (1929); Price v.
Marinette & Menominee Paper Co., 197 Wis. 25, 221 N.W. 381 (1928). See also
Connell v. Algonquin Gas Transmission Co., 174 F. Supp. 453 (D.R.I. 1959);
Cairo & F.R.R. v. Turner, 31 Ark. 494 (1876); Davis v. East Contra Costa Irr.
Dist., 19 Cal. 2d 140, 119 P.2d 727 (1941); Powers Farms, Inc. v. Consolidated
Irr. Dist., 110 P.2d 112 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941); Klein v. Commonwealth, 318
Mass. 592, 63 N.E.2d 360 (1945); Kunkle v. Borough of Ford City, 305 Pa. 416,
158 Atl. 159 (1931); Doty v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 123 Tenn. 329, 130 S.W.
1053 (1910). Contra, Housing Authority v. Savannah Iron & Wire Works, Inc.,
90 Ga. App. 150, 82 S.E.2d 244 (1954); State v. Marion Circuit Court, 238 Ind.
637, 153 N.E.2d 327 (1958); Strickler v. Midland Ry., 125 Ind. 412, 25 N.E. 455
(1890) ; Blackwell, E. & S. Ry. v. Bebout, 19 Okla. 63, 91 Pac. 877 (1907).
122. ARK. STAT. § 35-101 (1947); OHIo Rv. CODE ANN. § 2709.39 (Baldwin
1961).
123. Pima County v. Bilby, 87 Ariz. 366, 351 P.2d 647 (1960); State v. Leeson,
84 Ariz. 44, 323 P.2d 692 (1958) ; Renninger v. State, 70 Idaho 170, 213 P.2d 911
(1950) ; Leslie County v. Davidson, 270 Ky. 705, 110 S.W.2d 652 (1937) ; McDonald
v. Powell County, 199 Ky. 300, 250 S.W. 1007 (1923); Lucas v. Carney, 167 Ohio
St. 416, 149 N.E.2d 238 (1958). See also Maricopa County Municipal Water Con-
servation Dist. Number 1 v. Warford, 69 Ariz. 1, 206 P.2d 1168 (1949); V.T.C.
Lines, Inc. v. City of Harlan, 313 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1957); O'Reilly v. New York
Elevated R.R., 148 N.Y. 347, 42 N.E. 1063 (1896); State Highway Comm'n v.
Stumbo, 222 Ore. 62, 352 P.2d 478 (1960) ; Coos Bay Oyster Co-op. v. State High-
way Comm'n, 219 Ore. 588, 348 P.2d 39 (1959).
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The claim here involved is one based upon the liability incurred
when the State exercises its power of eminent domain without
pursuing the customary procedure therefor. In such a case the
cause of action is inverse condemnation and is not founded
either upon express contract or negligence.-G
In many states that do not have applicable statutes, the underlying
basis for granting inverse condemnation is the state constitutional
provision that guarantees just compensation.127
Some states have developed a curious variety of inverse condemna-
tion. As an appeal from a condemnation award is normally allowed,
the landowner, when no proceedings are brought, can treat the failure
to institute proceedings as an award of no damages and can ask for a
trial by jury. 28
Many actions are in effect inverse in nature even though the courts
do not use this term. Suits for "just compensation" often appear not
to be founded upon any common law action, but rather upon a right to
recover the compensation that would be awarded if there were a con-
demnation proceeding. 12 9 Although actions for "just compensation"
could be based upon tort, contract or some other convenient theory,
many are very similar to an inverse action and could be so classified.
One unusual type of inverse condemnation statute forces the land-
owner to act within a specified period. If the property owner does
not institute proceedings within this time, his right is waived. 3 0
124. Youngblood v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 15 Cal. Rptr. 904,
364 P.2d 840 (1961); Bellman v. County of Contra Costa, 54 Cal. 2d 363, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 692, 353 P.2d 300 (1960); Bauer v. County of Ventura, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 289
P.2d 1 (1955); City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17
(1949); Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943); City of
Los Angeles v. City of Glendale, 23 Cal. 2d 68, 142 P.2d 289 (1943) ; Rose v. State,
19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942); Hillside Water Co. v. City of Los Angeles,
10 Cal. 2d 677, 76 P.2d 681 (1938); Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 40
P.2d 486 (1935); Podesta v. Linden Irr. Dist., 141 Cal. App. 2d 38, 296 P.2d 401
(1956) ; Churchill v. Kellstrom, 58 Cal. App. 2d 84, 136 P.2d 602 (1943).
125. 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943).
126. Bacich v. Board of Control, supra note 125, at 347, 144 P.2d at 821.
127. Pima County v. Bilby, 87 Ariz. 366, 351 P.2d 647 (1960); State v. Leeson,
84 Ariz. 44, 323 P.2d 692 (1958); Renninger v. State, 70 Idaho 170, 213 P.2d 911
(1950) ; Lucas v. Carney, 167 Ohio St. 416, 149 N.E.2d 238 (1958).
128. Kentucky & W.Va. Power Co. v. Vanhoose, 295 Ky. 339, 174 S.W.2d
538 (1943); Broderick v. Dep't of Mental Diseases, 263 Mass. 124, 160 N.E. 404
(1928); Hafey v. Commonwealth, 189 Mass. 540, 76 N.E. 208 (1905).
129. Stuart v. Colorado E. Hy., 61 Colo. 58, 156 Pac. 153 (1916); City of
Hazard v. Eversole, 237 Ky. 242, 35 S.W.2d 313 (1931); McDonald v. Powell
County, 199 Ky. 300, 250 S.W. 1007 (1923); Lewis v. City of Potosi, 317 S.W.2d
623 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958) ; Frater v. Hamilton County, 90 Tenn. 661, 19 S.W. 233
(1891).
130. State v. Messenger, 27 Minn. 119, 6 N.W. 457 (1880) (overruled by
Electric Short Line Terminal Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 242 Minn. 1, 64 N.W.2d
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These statutes differ from most provisions for condemnation, which
confer the power on the taking body; they differ also from inverse
statutes which allow both the taking body and the landowner to in-
stitute the proceedings. Statutes that allow only the owner to insti-
tute proceedings and force him to do so within a certain time period
have generally been struck down as unconstitutional.231
IX. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The effect of state constitutional provisions upon the landowner's
right to compensation has been previously mentioned in. this note.
This section is devoted to a more detailed discussion of the effect of
these provisions. The applicable sections of the federal constitution
(i.e., the fifth and fourteenth amendments) will be discussed in an-
other section.
The state constitutional provisions are restrictions on the state's
inherent right of eminent domain. 132 New Hampshire and North
Carolina are the only states not explicitly requiring compensation for a
taking of private property for public use. New Hampshire's provision
states that "no part of a man's property shall be taken from him, or
applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of the repre-
sentative body of the people. 1 33 North Carolina has the following
general provision: "No person ought to be . . . in any manner de-
prived of his life, liberty or property, but by the law of the land." 134
At first the North Carolina courts said that this provision did not
provide for just compensation. However, the courts stated that just
compensation was a part of the fundamental law of North Carolina.131
In Parks v. Board of County Comm'rs,30 a North Carolina court rea-
soned:
149 (1954), insofar as the Messenger case held that constructive notice provided
by the legislative enactment was sufficient to start the time period running, within
which the landowner must act or waive his right.)
131. Electric Short Line Terminal Co. v. City of Minneapolis, supra note 130;
Board of Levee Comm'rs v. Dancy, 65 Miss. 335, 3 So. 568 (1887); Eby v. City of
Lewistown, 55 Mont. 113, 173 Pac. 1163 (1918); Kime v. Cass County, 71 Neb.
680, 101 N.W. 2 (1904), upholding on rehearing 71 Neb. 677, 99 N.W. 546 (1904).
132. United States v. A Certain Tract or Parcel of Land, 44 F. Supp. 712
(S.D. Ga. 1942); United States v. 8,557.16 Acres of Land, 11 F. Supp. 311 (N.D.
W.Va. 1935) ; Town of Mount Olive v. Cowan, 235 N.C. 259, 69 S.E.2d 525 (1952).
133. N.H. CoNsT. Part I, art. XII.
134. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 17.
135. Proctor v. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 230 N.C. 687, 55 S.E.2d
479 (1949); Yancey v. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 222 N.C. 106, 22
S.E.2d 256 (1942); Ivester v. City of Winston-Salem, 215 N.C. 1, 1 S.E.2d 88
(1939) ; Parks v. Board of County Comm'rs, 186 N.C. 490, 120 S.E. 46 (1923).
136. 186 N.C. 490, 120 S.E. 46 (1923).
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Notwithstanding there is no clause in the Constitution of North
Carolina which expressly prohibits private property from being
taken for public use without compensation; and although the
clause to that effect in the Constitution of the United States ap-
plies only to acts by the United States, and not to the government
of the state, . . . yet the principle is so grounded in natural
equity that it has never been denied to be a part of the law of
North Carolina. 1 7
More recently, Article I, Section 17 has been interpreted as providing
for just compensation, and the courts have held that the provision is
self-executing. 138
The other forty-eight states all provide for compensation to the
property owner when land is taken by a body having the power of
eminent domain.- 9 Many states enforce the constitutional provision by
making it self-enforcing or self-executing, 140 and award damages or
137. Id. at 499, 120 S.E. at 51.
138. Braswell v. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 250 N.C. 508, 108
S.E.2d 912 (1959); Debruhl v. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 247 N.C.
671, 102 S.E.2d 229 (1958); Sale v. State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 242
N.C. 612, 89 S.E.2d 290 (1955) ; Eller v. Board of Educ., 242 N.C. 584, 89 S.E.2d
144 (1955) ; McKinney v. Deneen, 231 N.C. 540, 58 S.E.2d 107 (1950).
139. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 23; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 18; ARK. CONST. art. II,
§ 22; Amiz. CONST. art. II, § 17; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15;
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 11; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 8; FLA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
§ 12; GA. CONST. art. H, § 301; HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 18; IDAHO CONST. art.
I, § 14; ILL. CONST. art. II, § 13; IND. CONST. art. I, § 21; IOWA CONST. art. I, §
18; Ky. BILL OF RIGHTS § 13; LA. CONST. art. I, § 2; ME. CONST. art. I, § 21; MD.
CONST. art. III, § 40; MASS. CONST. Part I, art. 10; MICH. CONST. art XIII, § 1;
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 17; Mo. CONST. art I, § 26;
MONT. CONST. art. III, § 14; NEB. CONsT. art. I, § 21; NEV. CONST. art. VIII, § 7;
N.J. CONST. art I, § 20; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 20; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7; N.D.
CONST. art. I, § 14; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 24; ORE.
CoNsT. art. I, § 18; PA. CONST. art. I, § 10; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 16; S.C. CONST.
art. I, § 17; S.D. CONsT. art. VI, § 13; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 21; TEX. CONST.
art. I, § 17; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 22; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 2; VA. CONST. § 58;
WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 13; W. VA. CONsT. art. III, § 9; WIS. CONsT. art. I, § 13;
WYo. CONST. art. I, §§ 32, 33. The Kansas Constitution provides for compensa-
tion only when the taking is by a private corporation. KAN. CONST. art. XII, § 4.
140. Dallas County v. Dillard, 156 Ala. 354, 47 So. 135 (1908); Pima County
v. Bilby, 87 Ariz. 366, 351 P.2d 647 (1960); Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123
P.2d 505 (1942); Podesta v. Linden Irr. Dist., 141 Cal. App. 2d 38, 296 P.2d 401
(1956) ; Board of Comm'rs v. Adler, 69 Colo. 290, 194 Pac. 621 (1920) ; Waters v.
De Kalb County, 208 Ga. 741, 69 S.E.2d 274 (1952); Smith v. Floyd County, 85
Ga. 420, 11 S.E. 850 (1890); Habersham County v. Knight, 63 Ga. App. 720, 12
S.E.2d 129 (1940) ; Fender v. Lee County, 31 Ga. App. 604, 121 S.E. 843 (1924) ;
Renninger v. State, 70 Idaho 170, 213 P.2d 911 (1950); Roe v. Cook County, 358
Ill. 568, 193 N.E. 472 (1934); De Moss v. Police Jury, 167 La. 83, 118 So. 700
(1928); State Highway Comm'n v. Mason, 192 Miss. 576, 6 So. 2d 468 (1942);
Thompson v. City of Winona, 96 Miss. 591, 51 So. 129 (1910); Tremayne v. City
of St. Louis, 320 Mo. 120, 6 S.W.2d 935 (1928); Hickman v. City of Kansas, 120
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compensation to the landowner simply on the basis of the constitu-
tional provision without statutory justification. The search for the
theory underlying the self-executing provision is not made easier by
courts that indicate that the remedy in the absence of a statutory
provision is based upon common law, 41 for the question still remains
what this "common law" remedy might be.142 The Oregon court in
Tomasek v. State Highway Comm'n'43 made the following comment
which is typical of many opinions.
The constitutional right and protection given the owner of
property . . . is unquestionably self-executing. It is an absolute
Mo. 110, 25 S.W. 225 (1894); Bohannon v. Camden Bend Drainage Dist., 240 Mo.
App. 492, 208 S.W.2d 794 (1948); Lewis v. City of Springfield, 142 Mo. App. 84,
125 S.W. 824 (1910); Less v. City of Butte, 28 Mont. 27, 72 Pac. 140 (1903);
County of Douglas v. Taylor, 50 Neb. 535, 70 N.W. 27 (1897); Braswell v. State
Highway & Pub. Works Conm'n, 250 N.C. 508, 108 S.E.2d 912 (1959) ; De Bruhl v.
State Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 247 N.C. 671, 102 S.E.2d 229 (1958);
Sale v. State Highway & Pub. Works Conm'n, 242 N.C. 612, 89 S.E.2d 290
(1955); Eller v. Board of Educ. 242 N.C. 584, 89 S.E.2d 144 (1955); McKinney
v. Deneen, 231 N.C. 540, 58 S.E.2d 107 (1950); Tomasek v. State Highway
Comm'n, 196 Ore. 120, 248 P.2d 703 (1952); Morrison v. Clackamas County, 141
Ore. 564, 18 P.2d 814 (1933) ; Derby Heights, Inc. v. Gantt Water & Sewer Dist.,
237 S.C. 144, 116 S.E.2d 13 (1960) ; Moseley v. State Highway Dep't, 236 S.C. 499,
115 S.E.2d 172 (1960); Clarke v. City of Greer, 231 S.C. 327, 98 S.E.2d 751
(1957) ; Smith v. City of Greenville, 229 S.C. 252, 92 S.E.2d 639 (1956) ; Milhous
v. State Highway Dep't, 194 S.C. 33, 8 S.E.2d 852 (1940); Chick Springs Water
Co. v. State Highway Dep't, 159 S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842 (1931) ; State v. Malone,
168 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943); Nelson County v. Loving, 126 Va. 283,
101 S.E. 406 (1919); Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Lowman, 126 Va. 424, 101 S.E.
326 (1919); Swift & Co. v. City of Newport News, 105 Va. 108, 52 S.E. 821
(1906); Morgan v. City of Logan, 125 W. Va. 445, 24 S.E.2d 760 (1943). See
also Blanchard v. City of Kansas 16 Fed. 444 (W.D. Mo. 1883); State Park
Comm'n v. Wilder, 260 Ky. 190, 84 S.W.2d 38 (1935) ; Dynes v. Town of Kilkenny,
153 Minn. 11, 189 N.W. 439 (1922); State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. O'Malley,
343 Mo. 658, 122 S.W.2d 940 (1938); McGrew v. Granite Bituminous Paving Co.,
247 Mo. 549, 155 S.W. 411 (1912) ; King v. City of Rolla, 234 Mo. App. 16, 130
S.W.2d 697 (1939); Greenwell v. A. V. Wills & Sons, 239 S.W. 578 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1922); Donaldson v. City of Bismarck, 71 N.D. 592, 3 N.W.2d 808 (1942);
Darnall v. State, 108 N.W.2d 201 (S.D. 1961); State v. Hale, 136 Tex. 29, 146
S.W.2d 731 (1941) ; City of Houston v. Anderson, 115 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Civ. App.
1938); Heldt v. Elizabeth River Tunnel Dist., 196 Va. 477, 84 S.E.2d 511 (1954).
Contra, Board of Conm'rs v. Blue Ribbon Ice Cream & Milk Corp., 231 Ind. 436,
109 N.E.2d 88 (1952).
141. Rose v. State, supra note 140; State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. O'Malley,
supra note 140; McGrew v. Granite Bituminous Paving Co., supra note 140;
Tomasek v. State, supra note 140; Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway
Dep't, supra note 140; Heldt v. Elizabeth River Tunnel Dist., supra note 140;
Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Lowman, supra note 140.
142. See text accompanying notes 149-62 infra.
143. 196 Ore. 120, 248 P.2d 703 (1952).
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right, and, for its violation, the injured person may have his
remedy in a common-law action in the absence of statutory pro-
vision therefor. 144
Many of the constitutional provisions serve as the basis for granting
relief on other theories such as implied contract 145 or inverse condem-
nation. 4 6 The state constitutional provisions also are used by some
courts as a ground for waiving the state's immunity from suit. 147
The importance of the state constitutional provisions should not be
minimized, for without them the landowner may have no right to
compensation. 48 In many states they not only create the right, but
also provide the theory of relief.
X. COMMON LAW RELIEF
Throughout the course of this note, cases have been cited that grant
relief in one form or another without specifying the theoretical basis
for granting the relief. Courts that speak in terms of "just compen-
sation"'4 9 and "self-enforcing constitutional provisions"15 ° give no in-
dication of the nature or basis of recovery. Many cases have indicated
that the relief is based on common law actions. 1' Typical court com-
ments include the following: South Carolina: "Where a statute or the
Constitution creates a right, but is silent as to the remedy, the party
entitled to the right may resort to any common law action which will
144. Id. at 143, 248 P.2d at 713.
145. See note 107 supra.
146. See note 127 supra.
147. Smith v. Floyd County, 85 Ga. 420, 11 S.E. 850 (1890); Fender v. Lee
County, 31 Ga. App. 604, 121 S.E. 843 (1924); Kentucky Bell Corp. v. Common-
wealth, 295 Ky. 21, 172 S.W.2d 661 (1943); Bernard v. State Dep't of Pub.
Works, 127 So. 2d 774 (La. Ct. App. 1961); Moseley v. State Highway Dep't, 236
S.C. 499, 115 S.E.2d 172 (1960); Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway
Dep't, 159 S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842 (1931) ; State v. Hale, 136 Tex. 29, 146 S.W.2d
731 (1941); Morgan v. City of Logan, 125 W. Va. 445, 24 S.E.2d 760 (1943).
148. See text accompanying notes 182-95 infra.
149. See note 129 supra.
150. See note 140 supra.
151. Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942) ; Housing Authority v.
Savannah Iron & Wire Works, Inc., 90 Ga. App. 150, 82 S.E.2d 244 (1954) ; Boise
Valley Constr. Co. v. Kroeger, 17 Idaho 384, 105 Pac. 1070 (1909) ; State ex rel.
City of St. Louis v. O'Malley, 343 Mo. 658, 122 S.W.2d 940 (1938); McGrew v.
Granite Bituminous Paving Co., 247 Mo. 549, 155 S.W. 411 (1912) ; Sale v. State
Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 242 N.C. 612, 89 S.E.2d 290 (1955) ; Tomasek v.
State Highway Comm'n, 196 Ore. 120, 248 P.2d 703 (1952); City of Rock Hill
v. Cothran, 209 S.C. 357, 40 S.E.2d 239 (1946); Chick Springs Water Co. v. State
Highway Dep't, 159 S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842 (1931); Heldt v. Elizabeth River
Tunnel Dist., 196 Va. 477, 84 S.E.2d 511 (1954). See also Anderson Cattle Co.
v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 180 Kan. 749, 308 P.2d 172 (1957).
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give him adequate redress.' ' 5 2 Idaho: "And for any taking or injury
for which the statute does not provide a remedy, the landowner may
sue at common law."'153 Missouri: "It is also well settled law that this
article of the Constitution gives an absolute right and is self-enforcing,
... resort may be had by the party entitled to the right to any com-
mon law action which will afford him adequate and appropriate means
of redress.""' Virginia: "[L] andowner may enforce his constitutional
right to compensation in a common law action."5 Oregon: "[T] he
injured person may have his remedy in a common law action in the
absence of statutory provision therefor."'
The question raised previously in this note still looms beneath the
surface of the court's language. What is the common law action to
which the courts refer?
In most of these cases the landowner is seeking monetary relief.
Therefore, writs of entry (ejectment) and injunction are eliminated
from consideration as the basis for common law recovery. Since the
relief sought is either for just compensation or for damages, it could
be implied that the actions are founded either in assumpsit or tres-
pass. Following this reasoning, the underlying common law basis for
these actions would be either ex delicto or ex contractu. From the
prior discussion of both tort and implied contractual relief, it would
appear that these are the bases of the "common law" remedy. An
Illinois court' 57 indicated that either tort or contract was the theory on
which it awarded a common law recovery based upon a constitutional
guaranty. The court said, "It is . . . immaterial whether the decla-
ration be considered as one in tort or in assumpsit ... .
Either an action in tort or contract "clearly" seems, then, to be the
basis for allowing recovery based upon a common law action. But this
conclusion was "clearly" eliminated, at least as far as North Carolina
is concerned by a decision of that state in 1955. In Sale v. State High-
way and Public Works Comm'n,59 the North Carolina court main-
152. Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Dep't, supra note 151, at 494,
157 S.E. at 847.
153. Boise Valley Constr. Co. v. Kroeger, 17 Idaho 384, 395, 105 Pac. 1070,
1073 (1909), citing 2 [sic 3] ELLIOTT, RAILROADs § 1048 (1st ed. 1897).
154. McGrew v. Granite Bituminous Paving Co., 247 Mo. 549, 564, 155 S.W.
411, 415 (1912).
155. Heldt v. Elizabeth River Tunnel Dist., 196 Va. 477, 482, 84 S.E.2d 511,
515 (1954).
156. Tomasek v. State Highway Conm'n, 196 Ore. 120, 143, 248 P.2d 703, 713
(1952).
157. Roe v. Cook County, 358 Ill. 568, 193 N.E. 472 (1934).
158. Id. at 575, 193 N.E. at 475.
159. 242 N.C. 612, 89 S.E.2d 290 (1955).
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tained that in the absence of statutory relief an action for damages
could be founded on a common law action. The court stated:
[W]hen the fundamental law of this State, based on natural jus-
tice and equity, prohibits the taking or acquisition of private
property for public use without the payment of just compensa-
tion, or its equivalent, and the North Carolina Constitution points
out no remedy, and if no statute affords an adequate remedy for
the depriving an owner of private property for public use without
just compensation, under a particular fact situation, the common
law which provides a remedy for every wrong will furnish the
appropriate action for the adequate redress of such grievance.
60
There is nothing shocking or unusual in the above quote. The court
has merely followed the frequent practice of granting relief based on
a common law remedy without indicating the action. But the signifi-
cant and perhaps shocking fact about the decision is that the court
went on to point out that the common law basis was not tort or con-
tract. Thus, at least in North Carolina, the previous conclusion that
tort or contract underlies common law recovery is shattered. Assum-
ing that tort or contract does not serve as the basis for awarding
relief based on common law, the court's decision again leaves an un-
answered question. What is "common law" relief?
The North Carolina case and others based on a common law remedy
differ from the cases that award damages or compensation without
attempting to give the theory. In the latter, there are no attempts to
provide a historical basis for granting relief, whereas in the former
there are efforts to connect the relief given at common law. Stuart v.
Colorado E.R.R.161 provides an example of a remedy granted without
an attempt to define the type of relief that was sought. The court points
out that in various states an action to recover compensation is desig-
nated by such names as ejectment, injunction, or trespass. "But,"
the court states, "the form or name of the action is immaterial. Such
actions are all akin to condemnation suits, and are to compel con-
demnation and payment for the right of way taken, and the damages
occasioned by the taking."'162 When a court makes such a statement,
it is recognizing that the action to recover compensation is not similar
to any normal type of civil action. Since condemnation is a special
proceeding, the court feels that an action to recover compensation
because of a failure to institute the proceedings should also be clas-
sified as a special action. There is no attempt to link the special action
to any common law proceeding. Perhaps this approach is more in-
tellectually honest than the approach that attempts to connect the
recovery to the common law. But whether or not the common law
160. Id. at 618, 89 S.E.2d at 296.
161. 61 Colo. 58, 156 Pac. 152 (1916).
162. Id. at 69, 156 Pac. at 156.
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approach is disliked, it must be considered as a major basis for grant-
ing relief to a landowner who has been deprived of his property
without just compensation.
XI. RELIEF AGAINST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 6 '
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution contains
the prohibition, "[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation." Without this protective right, Justice
Story states, "all other rights would become utterly worthless....,
Normally a federal agency that appropriates private property for
public use follows proper condemnation procedure. However, if the
federal government does not give compensation to the landowner, he
has an effective remedy.165 Acts of Congress, such as the Tucker Act,
provide that the property owner may proceed either in the Court of
Claims or the district courts to recover upon claims founded upon the
Constitution or upon contract either express or implied.""°
There is no clear indication of the theory underlying the suits for
compensation against the federal government. Are they based upon
an implied contract theory or are they based upon the Constitution?
Claims founded on either come within the statutory provisions. In
some cases the claim has been held to be based upon the fifth amend-
ment, 1 67 in others upon an implied contract,1 6 1 while several courts
163. Implied contract refers to implied in law rather than implied in fact
contract.
164. 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1790 (5th ed. 1891).
165. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933); Phelps v. United States,
274 U.S. 341 (1927); United States v. North American Co., 253 U.S. 330 (1920);
United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903); United States v. Great Falls Mfg.
Co., 112 U.S. 645 (1884); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166
(1871); Lacy v. United States, 216 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1954); Thibodo v. United
States, 187 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1951) ; Goodman v. United States, 113 F.2d 914 (8th
Cir. 1940); Sponenbarger v. United States, 101 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1939); Gulf &
S.I.R.R. v. Ducksworth, 286 Fed. 645 (5th Cir. 1923); Snowden v. Ft. Lyon
Canal Co., 238 Fed. 495 (8th Cir. 1916); Connor v. South Carolina Pub. Serv.
Authority, 91 F. Supp. 262 (E.D.S.C. 1950); United States v. A Certain Tract
or Parcel of Land, 44 F. Supp. 712 (S.D. Ga. 1942); Tilden v. United States, 10
F. Supp. 377 (W.D. La. 1934) ; Clement v. United States, 134 Ct. Cl. 466, 140 F.
Supp. 573 (1956); Coates v. United States, 117 Ct. Cl. 795, 93 F. Supp. 637
(1950); Cotton Land Co. v. United States, 109 Ct. Cl. 816, 75 F. Supp. 232
(1948) ; Forest of Dean Iron Ore Co. v. United States, 106 Ct. Cl. 250, 65 F. Supp.
585 (1946); Causby v. United States, 104 Ct. Cl. 342, 60 F. Supp. 751 (1945);
Boush Creek Land Corp. v. United States, 68 Ct. Cl. 56 (1929); Booth & Co. v.
United States, 62 Ct. Cl. 288 (1926) ; Hood v. United States, 46 Ct. Cl. 30 (1910);
Tompkins v. United States, 45 Ct. Cl. 66 (1910); Morris v. United States, 30
Ct. Cl. 162 (1895); Merriam v. United States, 29 Ct. Cl. 250 (1894).
166. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 (1948).
167. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933); United States v. Lynah, 188
U.S. 445 (1903); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871);
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have indicated that the suit may be based on a combination of the two
theories.0 9 In one of the earliest cases in which the United States
Supreme Court considered the right to compensation, Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Co., 70 the court held that the landowner was entitled to
compensation on the basis of the constitutional provision. The Eighth
Circuit later held that relief was based upon the fifth amendment 7'
without need for an implementing statute or a promise to pay. It said
that when a constitutional right is deemed to have been infringed,
relief may be granted even though the case sounds in tort against a
normally immune governmental body.'7 2
Other courts, however, indicate that jurisdiction results from an
implied contract between the property owner and the federal govern-
ment. In United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co.,' 7 3 decided in 1884,
the United States Supreme Court affirmed an award of compensation
made by the Court of Claims, holding that the law will imply a promise
to compensate when private property is taken for public use. Although
the court recognized that the obligation arose as a result of the fifth
amendment, it based jurisdiction on the implied contract between
Great Falls and the United States. Basing jurisdiction upon the por-
tion of the statute (Tucker Act) that allows federal suits to be
founded "upon any contract, express or implied, with the government
of the United States," the court stated that the present cause of ac-
Sponenbarger v. United States, 101 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1939); Gulf & S.I.R.R. v.
Ducksworth, 286 Fed. 645 (5th Cir. 1923); Clement v. United States, 134 Ct. Cl.
466, 140 F. Supp. 573 (1956); Cotton Land Co. v. United States, 109 Ct. Cl. 816,
75 F. Supp. 232 (1948) ; Causby v. United States, 104 Ct. Cl. 342, 60 F. Supp. 751
(1945); Hamburg-Am. Co. v. United States, 74 Ct. Cl. 360 (1932).
168. Phelps v. United States, 274 U.S. 341 (1927); United States v. North
American Co., 253 U.S. 330 (1920); United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112
U.S. 645 (1884) ; Lacy v. United States, 216 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1954) ; Thibodo v.
United States, 187 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1951); Snowden v. Ft. Lyon Canal Co., 238
Fed. 495 (8th Cir. 1916); Connor v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Authority, 91 F.
Supp. 262 (E.D.S.C. 1950); Forest of Dean Iron Ore Co. v. United States, 106
Ct. Cl. 250, 65 F. Supp. 585 (1946); Boush Creek Land Corp. v. United States,
68 Ct. Cl. 56 (1929); Hood v. United States, 46 Ct. Cl. 30 (1910); Tompkins v.
United States, 45 Ct. Cl. 66 (1910) ; Morris v. United States, 30 Ct. Cl. 162 (1895) ;
Merriam v. United States, 29 Ct. Cl. 250 (1894). See also Hurely v. Kincaid, 285
U.S. 95 (1932); Chilcutt v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Ky. 1946); Klebe
v. United States, 57 Ct. Cl. 160 (1922), aff'd, 263 U.S. 188 (1923).
169. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947); Goodman v. United
States, 113 F.2d 914 (8th Cir. 1940); United States v. A Certain Tract or Parcel
of Land, 44 F. Supp. 712 (S.D. Ga. 1942); Tilden v. United States, 10 F. Supp.
377 (W.D. La. 1934); Coates v. United States, 117 Ct. CI. 795, 93 F. Supp. 637
(1950) ; Booth & Co. v. United States, 62 Ct. Cl. 288 (1926).
170. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
171. Sponenbarger v. United States, 101 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1939).
172. Cotton Land Co. v. United States, 109 Ct. Cl. 816, 75 F. Supp. 232 (1948).
173. 112 U.S. 645 (1884).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1962/iss2/5
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
tion "is one that arises out of implied contract ... ,174 The implied
contract theory was more explicitly set forth in United States v. North
American Co.175 in which the court stated, "The right to bring this suit
against the United States in the Court of Claims is not founded upon
the fifth amendment... but upon the existence of an implied contract
entered into by the United States."'716
Many cases indicate that the action is really based partly on the
constitution and partly on an implied contract.'17  However, an implied
contract only arises because of the constitutional guaranty. Thus,
whether the court uses the Constitution or an implied contract as the
theory of recovery, the action can be traced back to the fifth amend-
ment. In Coates v. United States, 78 the court granted compensation
stating, "there is an implied promise to pay just compensation as re-
quired by the fifth amendment."' 79 If it were not for the fifth amend-
ment, there would be no obligation and no implied contract. As the
Supreme Court in United States v. Dickerson71 stated:
[W]hether the theory of these suits be that there was a taking
under the fifth amendment, and that therefore the Tucker Act
may be invoked because it is a claim founded upon the Constitu-
tion, or that there was an implied promise by the Government
to pay for it, is immaterial. In either event, the claim traces back
to the prohibition of the fifth amendment.... 18
Since the property owner recovers compensation regardless of the
theory that the court adopts, the choice may very well be immaterial.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note how the courts vacillate between
the two theories.
XIL FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
If there is no state remedy available to compensate a landowner for
property taken from him, would the landowner have any right to seek
relief in a federal court? The answer to the question is yes. A refusal
by a state court to grant compensation to a landowner whose property
has been taken constitutes a taking of property without due process of
law and hence violates the fourteenth amendment.
Before the passage of the fourteenth amendment an attempt was
made to apply the fifth amendment, which provides that private prop-
174. Id. at 657.
175. 253 U.S. 330 (1920).
176. Id. at 335.
177. Cases cited note 169 supra.
178. 117 Ct. C1. 795, 93 F. Supp. 637 (1950).
179. Id. at 798, 93 F. Supp. at 639.
180. 331 U.S. 745 (1947).
181. Id. at 748.
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erty shall not be taken for public use without compensation, 182 to the
states. But in 1833, in the famous case of Barron v. Mayor of Balti-
more,18 3 the City of Baltimore was charged with taking private pro-
perty for public use without giving just compensation, and the court
held that there was no ground for federal jurisdiction, since the fifth
amendment does not protect citizens from action taken by state or
local governments. This decision has been reaffirmed in many cases.,"
Although there is currently a theory that the first ten amendments
apply to the states as well as the federal government,18 5 it is safe to
conclude that the fifth amendment, as far as the courts are concerned,
does not apply to the states.
When the fourteenth amendment was adopted in 1868,188 the phrase
of the fifth amendment that prohibits private property from being
taken for public use without just compensation to the owner was not
included. The fourteenth amendment does, however, prohibit the
taking of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Whether
this general prohibition requires appropriating bodies to give just
compensation to private landowners thus becomes a matter of inter-
pretation. In 1877, soon after passage of the fourteenth amendment,
the United States Supreme Court held that the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment did not require that just compensation be
made to the property owner.187 The Court, relying heavily on the
exclusion of the phrase dealing with compensation, stated:
If private property be taken for public uses without just com-
pensation, it must be remembered that, when the fourteenth
amendment was adopted, the provision on that subject, in im-
mediate juxtaposition in the fifth amendment with the one we are
construing, was left out, and this was taken. 88
In 1897, the Supreme Court expounded a contrary opinion in Chicago,
B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago.189 The court held that a denial of compensa-
tion by a state court was an act of the state that constituted a denial
of due process of law as provided in the fourteenth amendment:
182. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
183. 32 U.S. (7 Peters) 243 (1833).
184. E.g., Cairo & F. R.R. v. Turner, 31 Ark. 494 (1876) ; Goolsby v. Board of
Drainage Comm'rs, 156 Ga. 213, 119 S.E. 644 (1923) ; Capital Water Co. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 44 Idaho 1, 262 Pac. 863 (1926) ; Wright v. House, 188 Ind. 247, 121
N.E. 433 (1919); Phillips v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 130 N.C. 513, 41 S.E. 1022
(1902) ; Smith v. Cameron, 106 Ore. 1, 210 Pac. 716 (1922).
185. 2 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 1056-82 (1953).
186. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
187. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877).
188. Id. at 105.
189. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
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In our opinion, a judgment of a state court, even if it be author-
ized by statute, whereby private property is taken for the State
or under its direction for public use, without compensation made
or secured to the owner, is, upon principle and authority, wanting
in the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States, and the affirmance of
such judgment by the highest court of the State is a denial by
that State of a right secured to the owner by that instrument.0 0
Since the above decision, statutes that deny or impede the acquiring
of compensation for property taken for public use have been struck
down as unconstitutional. 19 Many cases have asserted that the four-
teenth amendment requires just compensation for private property
taken for public use.1 12
Martin v. Creasy,0 3 a fairly recent Supreme Court case, denied
both injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment on the validity of a
state statute (the Pennsylvania limited access highway law). The
Court indicated that an uncompensated landowner can raise the fed-
eral question only after he has exhausted all his remedies in the state
courts. Denying federal jurisdiction, the Court asserted that the four-
teenth amendment right can be raised only after the landowner has
tried and failed to obtain state relief: "If, after all is said and done in
the Pennsylvania courts, any of the plaintiffs believe that the Common-
wealth has deprived them of their property without due process of
law, this Court will be here. ' 011 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Doug-
las strongly argued that the federal court should grant jurisdiction
whenever a determination of what constitutes a deprivation of prop-
erty is needed. He justified allowing a declaratory judgment in the
land appropriation cases on the basis of a fundamental right imbedded
in the Bill of Rights.' 5
190. Id. at 241.
191. Barker v. St. Louis County, 340 Mo. 986, 104 S.W.2d 371 (1937) ; Miller v.
City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951). See note 130 supra.
192. Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Colorado ex ret.
Watrous v. District Court, 207 F.2d 50 (10th Cir. 1953); Capital Water Co. v.
Public Util. Comm'n, 44 Idaho 1, 262 Pac. 863 (1926); Wright v. House, 188 Ind.
247, 121 N.E. 433 (1919); Weyler v. Gibson, 110 Md. 636, 73 Atl. 261 (Ct. App.
1909); Phillips v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 130 N.C. 513, 41 S.E. 1022 (1902);
McKinney v. Deneen, 231 N.C. 540, 58 S.E.2d 107 (1950); De Bruhl v. State
Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n, 247 N.C. 671, 102 S.E.2d 229 (1958) ; Blackman
v. City of Cincinnati, 66 Ohio App. 495, 35 N.E.2d 164 (1941); Miller v. City of
Beaver Falls, supra note 191; Brooksbank v. Leech, 206 Tenn. 176, 332 S.W.2d 210
(1959). See also Smith v. Cameron, 106 Ore. 1, 210 Pac. 716 (1922).
193. 360 U.S. 219 (1959).
194. Id. at 225.
195. Id. at 226-27.
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Thus, subject to the rule that state remedies must first be exhausted,
it seems clear that the landowner, under the fourteenth amendment,
can ultimately obtain relief in the Supreme Court of the United States.
CONCLUSION
An uncompensated property owner has rights under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments of the federal constitution, and under state
constitutional provisions, to recover for property taken without com-
pensation. These provisions probably guarantee a remedy, although
under the fourteenth amendment eventual relief depends upon prior
exhaustion of state remedies. The purpose of this conclusion is to
compare the various remedies that a property owner might have. The
remedies may be divided, for convenience, into those that give mone-
tary relief to the landowner and those that give another form of relief.
The remedies that provide for other than monetary relief are eject-
ment and injunction. Qualified injunction, mandamus, and equitable
lien are remedies that indirectly lead to monetary relief. Remedies
that give direct monetary relief include implied contract, actions
sounding in tort, actions based on self-enforcing constitutional pro-
visions, inverse condemnation, and those based on common law relief.
Also included within the latter category are the rare instances in
which an equity court will grant damages to provide relief.
The remedies of ejectment and injunction, although giving adequate
relief to the property owner, have the disadvantage of risking harm to
the public, as the taking body may be forced to stop its operations or
be evicted from the public use of land. The remedies that award mone-
tary relief, either directly or indirectly, are more appealing, since the
property owner is compensated for his loss and at the same time the
public does not suffer any harm. However, the qualified injunction
and equitable lien may ultimately have the same possible disadvantage
of ejectment and injunction and for that reason are not the most de-
sirable of remedies. Mandamus indirectly gives monetary relief and
forces a condemnation proceeding, but, being an extraordinary writ,
has the disadvantage of being difficult to obtain unless there is no
other remedy available.
Of those remedies that award direct monetary relief, self-enforcing
constitutional provisions and common law relief are adequate, but are
confusing since the courts that grant them have not adequately ex-
plained the underlying theory of relief. A comparison of two other
theories granting direct monetary relief indicates that an action based
on implied contract is much sounder than an action in tort, even
though few courts are willing to imply such a contract. A tort action
seems to put too much emphasis upon the allegation of a wrongful
taking, which is minor when the defendant has the power of eminent
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domain and hence the right to take property. An action based on an
implied contract does not assume a wrongful taking, but rather seeks
compensation for the property owner whose right to it is implied from
the taking.
The most appealing relief for an uncompensated property owner is
inverse condemnation. This is particularly true when there is a statute
to enforce the right. The inverse procedure supplies relief which puts
the parties in their respective places, as if there had been no wrong.
It has the same effect as a normal condemnation proceeding in that the
appropriating body is allowed to keep the land. No advantage is given
the taking body due to its failure to institute proceedings, while the
only disadvantage caused to the landowner is that he must affirma-
tively institute proceedings himself. The taking is not the wrongful
act, but rather the failure to make just compensation or institute pro-
ceedings, and this is rectified by the inverse action. The absence of an
underlying common law theory for the inverse action should not cause
any concern. Inverse, like normal condemnation, is a special statutory
proceeding96 that needs no common law basis.
The survey of the remedies granted and denied in various jurisdic-
tions shows that immense amounts of money and labor have been
spent in the effort to secure relief for what seems obviously to be a
wrong. The inverse condemnation provisions suggest that all the
trouble could have been saved, and that much more may be avoided,
by adding an amendment to the eminent domain statutes permitting
the action to be brought either by the landowner or the taking body.
196. This seems to be the preferable interpretation. See the division of authori-
ties in 6 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 24.1 (3rd ed. 1953).
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